THE NATION

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

Kennedy: Profile Of a Technician

Ted Lewis

'62 Lessons for '64

PEACE AT THE POLLS

Roger Hagan

Soviet Artists: The Urge Toward Freedom

Ernst Pawel and Alexander Werth

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LETTERS

Police legality

Long Beach, Calif.

Dear Sirs: The article, "Freedom and the Policeman," by Richard A. Myren, (The *Nation*, January 5) is a remarkable statement; such insight is rare within law-enforcement circles. The professor states that the administration of the criminal law "must be always handicapped by consideration for personal liberty" — another way of stating that some social order must be sacrificed if individual freedom is to be maintained.

More often than not, statements from police, or law-enforcement academicians, are like that of Chief William H. Parker, Los Angeles, who stated in an address to the Illinois State Chamber of Commerce that ". . . In severely limiting the powers of the police, it is anticipated that the police will ignore these legal limitations when the immediate public welfare appears to demand police lawlessness." To the shame of the police vocation, there are few law-enforcement practitioners, or academicians, who are willing to call so boldly for lawful enforcement of the law even at the expense of efficiency, and Professor Myren is to be commended for his unequivocal position. . . . It is high time that police rationalizations for illegalities and immoralities come to an end; it is high time that American police leadership speaks boldly for lawful enforcement of the law!

A. C. Germann, Chairman
Department of Police Science
Long Beach State College

Complementary

New York City

Dear Sirs: In your editorial, "Where Bargaining Fails," in the January 5 issue, you write that radio's coverage of the newspaper strike proves its inadequacy as a substitute for newspapers. Pardon if I suggest that your insecurities are showing. No one in the radio-news profession has suggested there is a substitute for newspapers. But there is, indeed, a vital *complement* to them — broadcast journalism — as valid and vital in the functions it performs as are the newspapers. . . . Come, gentlemen, let's stop the silly feud most people put to bed years ago. *Jerry Landay*
Director of News, WINS

Our new format

Galt, Ontario

Dear Sirs: Contrary to popular—and even to so-called knowledgeable—opinion, the typographer is not an infallible god of creativity. He is, rather, a matchmaker; one whose judgment is open to criticism. Indeed, his inspiration is often more diabolic than divine. He will, for instance, try desperately to disown responsibility for the occasional mésalliance that he arranges by declaring (with a shrug) that such a match "was made in heaven," and that he was "merely officiating" at the ceremony. Or he will rationalize, and refer to what was really a dogfight as "connubial bliss," aesthetically pleasing because of its "seemliness." In the latter case it's possible he has fallen for his own pitch; but it's more likely—if he's a real Machiavelli—that he will be chuckling silently beneath a righteously standfast-like exterior:

"I didn't lie. It wasn't a mistake. The Grotesque clash of two vaguely similar display types is, here, particularly pleasing. Let no man put these dogs asunder. May their violent antics forever disturb the Readers of *The Nation* and keep them from their Business."

Better not disarm HUAC till you've rooted out this one last subversive.

Guy Hillmer

Hollywood, Calif.

Dear Sirs: I'm impressed with your new look as introduced in your January 5 issue. As a newspaper man involved with typographical matters, I find your use of type in headlines, and your layout in general, pleasing to the eye. Congratulations.

Don A. Fortune

New York City

Dear Sirs: Congratulations on your new type and format. I think it is a great improvement. *Clark Foreman*

Champaign, Ill.

Dear Sirs: I want to congratulate you on the bright new typography which now graces *The Nation*. I find it pleasing both because it makes the magazine more readable and because it does not break too radically with the magazine's former design. I can still feel at home with *The Nation*.

Roger Ebert
Editor, *Daily Illini*

Dr. Benson replies

Searcy, Ark.

Dear Sirs: The Nation in its issue of June 30, 1962, did very faulty research with regard to its references to me, Harding College and the National Education Program.

For instance, it built-up Vance Muse as a very unsavory character. Then accused Jimmie Karam of joining with Muse. Then said of me "his anti-labor bias was so strong he even bestowed

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Their Finest Hour

President Kennedy has submitted his budget for fiscal 1964. The total is $98.8 billion; had he made it $99.9 billion, it would sound even more like a bargain basement. Of this tidy sum, $55.4 billion goes for "defense." Space is to get $5.7 billion: the budget reads $4.2 for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, but this does not include funds obligated. Most space work, of course, is connected with "defense" and U.S. prestige in the cold war. Of the miscellaneous items, totaling over $12 billion, it would be surprising if some were not connected with "defense"; where, for instance, is the Central Intelligence Agency? Thus the military budget alone, viewed realistically, is headed for the $60 billion mark and, at this rate, will reach it in fiscal 1965.

We behold here the climactic splendor of Western civilization. Nineteen hundred and sixty-three years after Christ died on the cross and in the third year of the Presidency of John F. Kennedy, with culture enthroned in Washington and the *Mona Lisa* on display, upwards of $55 billion—and going up, up, up—is dedicated to the sacred cause of mass slaughter. The United States has in its nuclear arsenal an estimated 30,000 megatons; 4,000 megatons is generally accepted as the amount required to destroy the Soviet Union as a social-political entity. Allowing 14,000 megatons for waste and shrinkage, we still have enough to wipe them off the face of the earth four times over. But we must have more.

To make the occasion still more glorious, we may be sure that whatever is cut from Mr. Kennedy's gargantuan budget will be cut from items tending to social improvement. On these the cold eye of the legislator-banker will be fixed and every million will be weighed in the balance. But the specifically military section of the budget is untouchable. Hardly a Congressman will touch a hair of it for, as Senator Proxmire has said, it is political suicide to vote against any item to which the defense label has been attached.

With the blandness which is one of his political assets in a tight spot, Mr. Kennedy has termed his budget "frugal." This will not protect him from Congressional assault and the bitter recriminations of General Eisenhower, George M. Humphrey (unless he has given up in despair) and other apostles of economic orthodoxy. Truly, Mr. Kennedy has set this house on fire, and the full extent of his arson is not obvious until one considers that his almost-$100 billion proposals are coupled with a request for a tax cut, and an admitted deficit of $9.2 billion. Since Mr. Kennedy submitted a 1963 budget indicating a surplus of $500 million and ended up with a deficit of $8.8 billion, some may share Senator Byrd's apprehension that the actual deficit under the 1964 proposals will run to $14 billion.

The Congressional economizers may succeed in trimming a few hundred millions here and there, particularly where welfare aims, always suspect, appear to be involved. But defense will remain sacred, and so will space and the further accumulation of plutonium. If, by some inconceivable political phenomenon, a defense item should be cut, that will not be the end of it. Next January the President is free to come back with supplementary budget requests. Currently he is asking for an extra $3.9 billion for the current budget which Congress failed to vote in 1962. The end is not yet nor, as far as Mr. Kennedy is concerned, is it in sight.

What's He Up To?

Elsewhere in this issue (page 92), Ted Lewis points out that while the public knows a lot about the President's techniques of leadership, they know little of where he is leading them. Even newsmen and legislators, who are in a position to know more, must be puzzled by the President's way of selling the budget to the Congress and the electorate. It is scarcely likely that he really expects anyone to regard it as an austerity budget. Initial reaction confirms this surmise. The welfare advocates are outraged at the size of the defense segment, the financial community is—or professes to be—outraged at the size of the welfare segment, such as it is; even the military are smarting over the $13 billion which, it is said, Secretary McNamara slashed off their asking price. What is Mr. Kennedy's strategy? In particular, how does he expect to get a budget of this beam through a channel narrowed by his simultaneous request for a tax cut?

It would be a great mistake to overestimate Mr. Kennedy's skill in maneuver, particularly in the employment of feints and finesses. To do so may make him even more Machiavellian than he actually is; the President has invited skepticism by his record of two years in the Presidency. One lead may be found in a speech made last week by Theodore C. Sorensen, the President's special counsel and speech writer, at a luncheon given by the Democratic National Committee for the party's state officials. Said Mr. Sorensen: "'If we can get action this year on a tax bill, we could take it to the people as a party in 1964, and not simply to the special interest groups, but all the people."

And get a maximum harvest of votes. But why action this year? By next year, the appetite for a tax cut will be whetted. Moreover, since for the small taxpayer the actual cut will be exceedingly small, he would be more impressed by the hoopla over the forthcoming cut than he will be by the cut itself when it arrives. (The cut may be still smaller if it turns out that tax reform includes a reduction in such loopholes and exemptions as the small taxpayer now enjoys.) It might, therefore, be Kennedy-like strategy to propose the tax cut this year, when it is likely to be crushed

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by the massive budget. He can then let the debate proceed, pose as the champion of the downtrodden, fight (but not too hard) for welfare items, and pass the onus of defeat onto the Southern Democrats and the Republicans. Next year he may do better, and his good intentions will be fresh in the minds of the voters, even though the tangible results will not amount to much for most of them.

To repeat: in his budgetary operations, Mr. Kennedy may not be following such devious ways at all. He may be as innocent as the new-born babe. But one must note that it doesn't look that way.

The Inner-Directed General

General de Gaulle may well be the most exasperating statesman of the postwar period; many of the political leaders who have had to deal with him have said as much. But for all that he is a man of rare distinction. In a troubled period in world history in which problems of "identity" seem to be of major concern to an ever-larger section of the public, including political leaders preoccupied with their "images," de Gaulle stands as a monument to the idea that a man who knows who he is, who has firm convictions, and who is not troubled in the slightest degree by doubts about his own "identity," can move mountains and agitate oceans. General de Gaulle has no "image"; the image is General de Gaulle. This strong sense of self-identity sustained him during France's years of degradation and carried him to pinnacles of glory and grandeur in the hour of her triumph. It enabled him to end the bloodletting in Algeria. It accounts, in fact, for all his triumphs and it no doubt explains why he can be, on occasion, a most exasperating man. He does not convince by his rhetoric, which is impeccable, nor by his ideas, which are seldom remarkable. He prevails because he is Charles de Gaulle, a person in whom the General, so to speak, has great confidence.

Whether one agrees or not, there is something admirable in his attitude toward Great Britain's efforts to enter the Common Market. For his own reasons, he does not think that Britain belongs in the New Europe. This is not surprising; many of Britain's leaders have reached the same conclusion. What is revolutionary about his attitude is the bluntness with which he said what he thought about the matter. *Newsweek* reports that word leaked out from a Cabinet meeting that he had said: "When you tell the truth, you always shock people." Later he authorized a direct quote: "In today's world there is a sort of universal agreement that realities should not appear openly, but should be carefully hidden under surface appearance. When someone is impertinent enough to point out these truths, nobody seems able to get over it." Quite right. And what can be added is that, often enough, outspokenness turns out to be the better policy. Of all the Western statesmen, one has a feeling that the one whose determination Khrushchev does not need to test and the one he would test with the greatest caution would be General de Gaulle.

It is not unlikely that the General's blunt talk about the New Europe may, in the end, lead to a situation in which a truly independent Europe — although one friendly to and in broad agreement with this country —would be able to exert a greater force for peace and stability than a "partner" acting under the gentle but firm guidance of the United States. On this country, as on other matters, the General's views are clear and cogent. He once wrote—*Newsweek* quotes the passage—that "The United States, delighting in her resources, feeling that she no longer had within herself sufficient scope for her energies, wishing to help those who were in misery or bondage the world over, yielded in her turn to that taste for intervention in which the instinct for domination cloaked itself." The General may irritate Washington and be resented in London, but he remains triumphantly himself, at all times, on all occasions; and, in these days of other-directedness, this is no mean achievement.

Due Process Is for All

Perez Jimenez was one of the most execrable Presidents Venezuela has ever had, and that is saying a good deal. When he was overthrown in the revolution of 1958 which brought Romulo Betancourt to power, he sought and received refuge in the United States. Well-behaved and well-heeled, the ex-dictator lived the good life on the Florida beaches. In August, 1959, however, a cloud appeared on the Perez Jimenez horizon. Venezuela sought his extradition for high crimes and misdemeanors committed during his Presidency. He was arrested and arraigned in federal court. On August 24, 1959, he was released on bail and he remained on bail till December 12, 1962. The bail varied from $25,000 to $100,000.

On December 12, however, Judge William A. McRae, a recent Kennedy appointee to the Federal District Court in Florida, revoked bail and since then Perez Jimenez has languished in the Dade County hoosegow. An appeal is pending before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans but, owing to a technicality, the ex-dictator cannot get bail in this proceeding. His distinguished counsel has tried various ways of securing a writ of *habeas corpus*, the traditional remedy in such cases, but so far without success. Perez Jimenez is in a position to post bail in any required amount, but he remains in jail.

From all that appears in the record, the judge's revocation was on his own initiative. No showing was made that Perez Jimenez had engaged in political activity or in any way abused his asylum in the United States. In Miami, suspicion is voiced that there may be more here than meets the eye. On February 19, Romulo Betancourt is scheduled to visit President Kennedy. That Perez Jimenez is, or has been, in an American jail may be a diplomatic manifestation of Latin American solidarity. It is said that the Venezuelan Government doesn't want Perez Jimenez back at all; they are having trouble enough with their Communists and right-wing militarists as it is. A connection is also suggested with the fact that Dean Acheson,

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every now and then a consultant for the State Department and a very influential one, represents the Venezuelan Government in the United States.

All this is as it may be. Clearly, however, the matter calls for an airing. Perez Jimenez may deserve hanging, but citizens and aliens alike are entitled to the guarantees of the Constitution of the United States and to due process of law. What was the reason for the revocation of bail? Why can't this alien's lawyer secure a writ of *habeas corpus*? Is justice to be managed from Washington as the news is managed? These are questions which require an answer, no matter who is involved.

Study in Motivation

If one were to say in so many words that one motivation for military spending in the United States is to hold back other types of spending, the person making such a charge would be denounced as paranoid, or worse, as Marxist. But this very reason is given quite frankly in a series of full-page ads in *Look* by the "Investor-Owned Electric Light and Power Companies," of which there are stated to be more than 300 across the nation. Whether all of them are paying for this ingenuous publicity is not stated, but the ad invites the reader to write *Look* for the names of the sponsors.

Almost all the space in the ads is taken up by a picture designed to swell the bosoms of all who delight in American military might. One week it was the Skybolt, now unhappily gone to the boneyard of forgotten missiles. Another week the bow of U.S.S. *Enterprise*, the world's first atomic-powered aircraft carrier, towered over the reader. The caption under Skybolt was: "WHEN THE SKYBOLT RIDES A BOMBER YOUR TAX DOLLARS BUY DEFENSE. BUT when your tax money is used to build more and more federal-government-owned electric plants and lines, it is spent needlessly. . . . Wouldn't it make more sense for the federal government to stop such needless spending, and use your tax money only for essentials such as defense?"

The *Enterprise* ad carried the same argument. "WHEN THE *ENTERPRISE* MAKES KNOTS," it read, "you can actually see your tax dollars at work—working usefully . . . paying for America's world-wide defense. . . . The nation is much better able to pay for it when the government cuts out *needless* spending. Yet some people are urging the federal government to build more electric plants and lines. . . . Electric power is a field where the government can save your tax dollars—not spend them." (Italics in original.)

Private-utility companies provide light, heat and power. In this case they are providing light, though scarcely the sort they intended.

Cracks in the Blocs

The strains within each of the two great world blocs are rapidly becoming as dominating an issue as the East-West confrontation. How important are these strains and how do they affect the chances for an East-West *rapprochement*? This subject will soon be discussed in *The Nation* by Fred Warner Neal, former State Department consultant on Russian Affairs and author of *War and Peace and Germany* (W. W. Norton, 1962).

'62 Lessons for '64

PEACE AT THE POLLS . . . . . Roger Hagan

Two years into the New Deal, just as we are now two years into the New Frontier, the trial marriage of native American radicalism and the Roosevelt administration appeared to be over, and an insurgency that seemed to promise a fundamental reconstruction of American politics began taking shape. The promise was not fulfilled, but it might have been; and since we now stand at a similar point in the political cycle, there is more than nostalgic interest in recalling the mood of that period. The only radicalism with any grassroots strength today seems to be the peace movement, which had its meaningful political baptism in last November's elections. Does it hold forth more promise, or less, than the insurgency of the early thirties?

Discussing results of the 1934 elections, *The Nation's* lead editorial ventured to wish out loud:

> *There is genuine cause for rejoicing in the striking triumph of the new Progressive Party in Wisconsin . . . as well as in the splendid victory of [Farmer-Laborites] Governor Olson and Senator Shipstead in Minnesota. If the independent parties in these two states can get together, it is possible that they may yet grow into an effective national third party movement.*

The next week's *Nation* warned that the ugly defeat of Upton Sinclair's "End Poverty in California" Democratic gubernatorial campaign "shows what will happen to any radical who attempts to challenge the existing order through the medium of old party politics." Before long an extended discussion was under way in the letters column about the possibilities for a new United Liberal Party.

The Nation was not unique with these speculations. Many liberals and radicals had concluded that a Democratic administration would never make the serious, deep-reaching changes in the economic and social structure that they felt the times demanded. John T. Flynn had written in *Scribners* in late 1934 that if the proper kind of economic planning were to be undertaken, it

Roger Hagan, editor of the Council for Correspondence Newsletter, *spent much of last year studying the political aspects of the American peace movement on a grant from the Rabinowitz Foundation.*

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would be because radicals had seized upon the "historic moment" that was developing for "the launching of a powerful third party upon modern radical economic issues." John Dewey and Paul Douglas' League for Independent Political Action had resolved, at a conference in late 1933, that the people must "rise up and win economic and political control" to achieve "a new social order, a scientifically planned system"; and as a beginning, the conference had formed the Farmer-Labor Political Federation and called for a new political party. Wisconsin's Progressives also called themselves a new national party; and Phil La Follette, who won the governorship on their ticket in 1934, insisted that radical state parties could spread on their model and bring about "a national third party — a real leftist party" by 1940.

The elections of '34, adding nine Democrats to the House and ten to the Senate, were much more a mandate to the New Deal than those of 1962 were to the New Frontier, but the hopefulness of the insurgents was undiminished. Governor Floyd Olson wrote in *Common Sense* in 1935 that "a third party must arise"; Montana Senator Burton K. Wheeler looked forward to one; the American Commonwealth Political Federation, led by Congressman Tom Amlie (Prog., Wis.), Alfred Bingham of *Common Sense*, and (now Senator) Paul Douglas, constituted itself a crypto-party to jell, if necessary, by 1936. In the State of Washington, the Democratic Party, captured by the Commonwealth Builders movement between 1934 and 1936, committed itself to the radical goals of public ownership and production-for-use. In short, entirely apart from the activities of the American Marxist parties, there was a ferment of native radicalism after two years of the New Deal, a mood of insurgency apparently ready to coalesce into a significant political force to bring about structural changes which the New Deal evidently had no intention of attempting. People with radical goals had found themselves still outside the system, and they were devising bold new strategies to get back in.

Currently the equivalent of these native insurgents is a strongly non-political collection of candidates and groups, largely middle class and without serious domestic discontents, whose disillusionment with the Administration is over foreign, not domestic, policy. To a veteran of the thirties, peace politics is no politics at all: no view of history, no domestic agenda, no idea of structural changes that might reach causes rather than symptoms, hardly even a clear idea of what to do to replace what is protested. It seems more a mood than a program, an *affaire des femmes*, a naive cry of anguish against the hard ironies of contemporary life. Viewed overall, it had no strategy in 1962, no political base, no popular cause to compare with the condemnation of greed and injustice of yesteryear, no strong allies on the inside like Senators Wheeler, Norris and La Follette, Congressmen Amlie, Maverick, Lundeen, Boileau, Walgren and Marcantonio, no strong-rooted politicians like LaGuardia; and, most to the point, no significant victories. After the elections, it looked even less like the making of a third party than before—when to be sure, it had looked little enough like it.

None the less, the problems and prospects of the new peace politicians are not so different from those of the insurgents of the 1930s as it may appear—indeed, their prospects may be better—nor is their weak showing and relative silence since the elections a safe guide to their future potential. To an extent, their weakness may be an advantage and their silence a good omen. They start with fewer illusions and may, as a result, evolve a more practical strategy for affecting American life with their concerns than proved possible for the radicals of 1934-36.

On the other hand, although their demands seem more circumscribed than those of the thirties, they have an immensely more difficult task. For if the 1962 elections taught them anything, it was that significant blocs of votes will not swing their way simply upon the intelligent articulation of peaceful alternatives and initiatives to reduce tension. Tension and polarization, they learned, are not recognized evils like starvation and injustice. Rather they are built into the system, integral parts of present-day life—for all classes.

In other words, the burden of peace politics is not merely to alter a small segment of public policy, but to undertake the most awesome task of reforming popular attitudes ever attempted by a minority in the history of American politics. How far this realization will lead them to extend their critique back into the focus of politics as the older generation of insurgents regarded it—into the structure of American society—remains to be seen. Their experience in the campaigns of 1962 was varied, and the strategy to which it may give rise is still much in question. Vague and incomplete as it is, however, that experience itself is, at the moment, their most valuable asset. Does it add up to anything?

There were thirty-two campaigns in 1962 in which the peace movement took particular interest. The table on the next page ranks the candidates according to the importance they gave the peace issue. Several other candidates, like Senators Clark and McGovern, supported by National SANE or the Council for Abolishing War, would be below those at the end of the list. The table is only a rough indication of how much initiative the peace movement took in the campaigns, however. The second group of candidates generally received less aid from peace groups than the third group because of their poor chances or because of disorganization of peace groups in their areas. Some in the fourth group won strong support because of their credibility as politicians. The list excludes candidates for state and local office who got help from peace groups, such as Assembly candidates Reed Searle in California and Manfred Ohrenstein in New York.

There were ten "pure" peace candidates; or, by a slightly broader definition, seventeen (comprising the first two groups in the table). None of the seventeen won office. Four were nominees of major parties, six ran as independents either on the ballot or as write-ins, and seven more lost primaries seeking major party nomination. One of the latter subsequently ran as a (N.Y.) Liberal. All but two of the remaining fifteen candidates were regular Democrats who could only loosely be called peace candidates. Curiously, these two—Pacht and Kowalski—were opposed by Democratic chieftains on grounds other than their foreign-policy views.

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Results of Candidacies Supported by Peace Groups

*Name, Office Sought and Party**	*District*	*% of Vote*
"PURE" PEACE CANDIDATES		
Harry Purvis (H., Ind.)	N.Y. 4th	1
Harrop Freeman (H., Lib.)	N.Y. 33rd	3
Elizabeth Boardman (H., R.)	Mass. 3rd	48 P**
Helen Bliss (H., D.)	N.H. 2nd	27 P**
William Hefner (H., D.)	Mass. 1st	28
H. Stuart Hughes (S., Ind.)	Mass.	2.4
Sidney Lens (H., Ind.)	Ill. 2d	1
Robert Cosbey (H., Ind.)	Ill. 13th	1
Alva Tompkins (H., Ind.)	Ill. 9th	1
Herbert F. Hoover (S., R.)	Iowa	15 P**
OUTSPOKEN CONCERN FOR PEACE		
William O. Hart (S., Ind.)	Wis.	1
Elizabeth Weideman (H., D.)	Mich. 16th	14 P**
Caroline Ramsay (H., D.)	Md. 7th	30
Alice F. Bryant (H., D.)	Wash. 1st	27
William Meyer (S., D.)	Vt.	45 P**
James Youngdale (H., DFL)	Minn. 6th	49 P**
Knox Mellon (H., D.)	Calif. 24th	30
SYMPATHETIC BUT NOT OUTSPOKEN		
John O'Connell (H., D.)	Calif. 6th	42
George Brown (H., D.)	Calif. 29th	56
Edward Roybal (H., D.)	Calif. 30th	57
Jerry Pacht (H., D.)	Calif. 31st	P***
William Stewart (H., D.)	Calif. 12th	38
Jerome Ziegler (H., D.)	Ill. 14th	40
Martin Dworkis (H., D.)	N.Y. 17th	32
Bob Wilson (H., D.)	Ill. 22nd	39
Tom Payne (H., D.)	Mich. 2nd	42
GENERALLY LIBERAL, CAUTIOUS ON PEACE		
Blaine Whipple (H., D.)	Ore. 1st	48
Lionel Van Deerlin (H., D.)	Calif. 37th	51
Frank Kowalski (S., D.)	Conn.	****
Robert Kastenmeier (H., D.)	Wis. 2nd	53
Charles Weidner (H., D.)	Calif. 14th	37
William Fitts Ryan (H., D.)	N.Y. 20th	73

*H., House; S., Senate; R., Republican; D., Democrat; L., Liberal; Ind., Independent.
**Primary vote; never reached General Election.
***Primary vote; ran second to winner in field of nine.
****Defeated in convention before Primary.

Of the thirteen Democrats who reached the General Elections in the lower half of the list, five won House seats, including two incumbents. In the entire list, fourteen candidates lost to incumbents in November, and of these, six cut the incumbents' percentages below the 1960 showing. But only two of these were in unaltered districts, and only one of the eight whose opponents increased their percentages was in an unaltered district. Redistricting has made it impossible to draw conclusions from the figures about such candidates' ability to threaten incumbents on the basis of the peace issue alone.

There was no consistency among the seventeen peace candidates on domestic policy. Excluding Hughes, the first group discussed domestic issues only as related to the arms race; the second group had a broader platform. Three of the seventeen were Republicans and two others more conservative than most of their workers. Ramsay, on the other hand, was by any standards liberal. As to background, the candidates included four professors and three other educators, two bank presidents, an accountant, a lawyer, two farmers, two newsmen, a printer, a manufacturer, a forester and several professional politicians.

This suggests the variety of persons and styles that made up the "peace" campaigns. A focus on candidates such as this can be misleading, however. It is not the candidate or the size of his vote that might ultimately affect the politics of his district, but the people working for him. The vote was unquestionably disappointing, but the experience of politics may count for more in this first year of the peace movement's cautious insurgency.

"I told these peace guys you've got to make up your mind what you want to do: elect Wilson to Congress or use his candidacy as a platform for peace education." The Democratic chairman of a down-state Illinois city was getting hot under the collar just remembering his warning. "Now if you want to build a twenty-foot cross and nail him up there and put footlights on him, go ahead and do it, but if you want to get him elected to Congress then you've got to just shut up. And work like hell ringing doorbells."

He was speaking of Robert Wilson, candidate for Congress from Illinois' 22nd District, a farmer and owner-editor of a string of country weekly newspapers. Wilson is a well-informed liberal with roots in his section of Illinois that go back for generations, and his editorials have made him well known in much of the district. He was, therefore, the best political material the Democrats had laid hands on for years. But he is also a practicing Quaker, and his pacifism made him want to differ with the Administration on defense policy. Around the University of Illinois, in the eastern part of his district, there were some local peace groups eager to support him if he would begin to build a policy on his good instincts.

As it happened, he never did. The peace groups came into his campaign too late with too little. They had also insisted on interviewing the Republican incumbent, who had held them up for weeks. Wilson's closest advisers and managers, while not professional politicians, were predominantly concerned about the problems of winning and turning him into a credible, respectable candidate. Many of these advisers were themselves liberals who had long been engaged in discouraging battle with the entrenched down-state pros. But the chance to hitch a ride with a strong, hard-campaigning candidate with real roots in his district and a mind good enough to explain the Administration to the cautious, pros-

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perous farmers of the 22nd District was enough to turn them into hard-nosed professionals when confronted with the idealists of the academic and women's peace groups.

The pattern here was a familiar one. The Democratic Party official himself expressed the primary dilemma of the peace movement in politics. "Me," he said, "an old NAACP, ACLU, ADA liberal, I have to talk like a real conservative Republican to keep from hurting the poor guy. You've really got to change roles in a hurry if you want to get anything done." The new militants of the peace movement are not about to change roles in a hurry: although, be it said in their favor, they did, here and elsewhere, accept compromise positions and work ringing doorbells, watching polls, distributing literature, raising money, running mimeo machines and licking stamps. Not often, however, did they "shut up."

When it was over, those who *had* held their tongues for a while and immersed themselves in the machinery of a campaign had to ask if the sacrifice had been vindicated. Where they had worked for a regular party candidate who merely showed sympathy for their concerns, such as Wilson in Illinois, Payne in Michigan, Pacht, Weidner or the more outspoken O'Connell in California, or Whipple in Oregon, the results were often discouraging —no victory, and not much public education. And in the few places where their man won, victory seemed attributable to factors other than themselves. Edward Roybal in the 30th District of California (Los Angeles), for example, seemed most indebted to a lackadaisical opponent and to his Mexican-American nationality. He won with 57 per cent of the vote in a district which includes 35-40 per cent Mexican-Americans. But here at least peace people were useful in getting the Democrats registered, a particular problem in such a district. Elsewhere their aid was even less clearly a benefit.

George Brown's 29th District in Southern California was safe in terms of party registration (62 per cent Democratic) and Brown, as a former city councilman, mayor of Monterey Park and state Assemblyman, was well known to the electorate. Even so, his vote, at 56 per cent, was lower than expected. His opponent had hit hard at Brown's pro-SANE views, and this apparently had cut into his margin. Brown publicly acknowledges the helpfulness of SANE, the women's peace groups and Californians for Liberal Representation (CLR), an offspring of the California Democratic Club movement (CDC) formed to aid candidates strong on disarmament, civil liberties and civil rights. In terms of what campaign managers call "bodies" — precinct workers — and money contributed, the peace groups gave Brown more help than his most important labor support, and more than the national and state Democratic Committees. Privately, however, he wonders if peace-group support did not do enough harm to offset the gains. The consensus of the managers of the few regular party candidates about whom the peace groups were enthusiastic was that their help was fine if restricted to "bodies" with no strings attached. But public endorsements were not always welcomed.

Many in the peace movement knew that working for a party candidate would involve them in compromises without any opportunity for open criticism of Administration policy. The demand to retain their clarity was argued out in local meetings from Boston to Los Angeles, and the decisions were never final. In Boston, the result was a high mortality rate of advisers and campaign managers in the Hughes campaign, some being eased out because they were too rigid for practical politics, some because they were too practical to inspire volunteer energies. In Los Angeles, years of experience in the Democratic club movement made some leaders of CLR and SANE wary of the unknown candidates with good platforms but no organizational base who turned up to contest primaries; there was an unusual abundance of such people in California. Yet the same experience made others wary of formal linkage to the Democratic Party of Jesse Unruh and John F. Kennedy, because they valued their program and their identity. They preferred to adhere to a clear set of policy demands and promised support to whoever agreed with them.

Essentially the same arguments, in other words, took place in Los Angeles on the basis of experience as took place in Massachusetts on the basis of inexperience, only at a different level of possibility. There was little hope of success for the Political Action for Peace (PAX) candidates: Hughes, Hefner and Boardman in Massachusetts, and Bliss in New Hampshire. Of the three seeking regular party nomination, all in districts securely in the opposite camp, only Hefner reached the general election — no other Democrat wanted the nomination — and he took only a quarter of the vote from incumbent Representative Silvio Conte. Los Angeles, on the other hand, presented a choice between allocating resources among all candidates who expressed good views or restricting them to a few real politicians with good sentiments whose districts showed 57 per cent or better registration in their party. Because the latter course was chosen, outspoken candidates like Knox Mellon and William Stewart went unsupported, even though their districts gave them far greater strength than most House candidates elsewhere in the country whom the peace movement would support. The political experience gained by amateurs in the California Democratic Clubs (CDC) made such hard choices possible (much of the peace movement would not have made them); but beyond the primaries, where concentration of resources was clearly fruitful, the choice was not fully vindicated.

Since it was impossible to say whether peace-group support helped or hindered them, the victories probably did not strengthen the peace movement's bargaining position in California politics, which had been one hope of those arguing for practicality over ideology. The most extreme case was that of Lionel Van Deerlin of San Diego. In spite of CLR support, he said nothing about most key peace issues, but discussed only economic planning for reconversion, an obvious need in defense-contract-bound San Diego. He won with 51 per cent of the vote after being attacked vigorously by his opponent for taking CLR support (the group gave him over $1,000, but no workers). His debt to the peace groups was far from unequivocal.

The California groups around Brown, Roybal, Van Deerlin and O'Connell opted for success. They did not entirely abandon clarity, since they published their own plat-

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forms and secured some explicit agreement from the candidates they supported, but they saw little made of their issues in the campaigns. As George Brown put it, he saw no value in excessive candor. Nor did they secure any assurance that their men would vote in a particular way when they got to Washington. Elsewhere in the country, groups which followed a similar path had even less satisfaction from their candidates; such was the disorganization of the New York groups that no statement could be agreed upon for the candidates to support, and peace-concerned liberals supporting William Fitts Ryan, Bentley Kassal, Martin Dworkis, Frank Montero, James Scheuer and David Levy did so mostly because of their reform status and their generally liberal outlook, not because they had them on the line for peace.

For many members of peace groups and liberal organizations in Chicago, the story was the same; SANE and the Independent Voters of Illinois (IVI) supported Kennedy Democrats such as Sidney Yates for Senate or Barratt O'Hara for the House with little to show for it in terms of foreign and defense policy agreement except that, as one leader of Chicago SANE said of Yates, "He reads all the literature I send him." But one Chicago organization made the opposite decision. For Voters for Peace and its intellectual entrepreneur, Sidney Lens, a writer and labor official, a political campaign seemed the one opportunity to say what needed to be said and have somebody besides the faithful brethren listening. Lens hoped to begin building a bloc of electoral strength rigorously committed to new policies in foreign and defense affairs, a bloc that would not fall apart at the last minute. Since many Congressmen win by margins of less than 5 per cent, Lens thought that, as candidates, they should be sensitive to small, well-organized blocs of votes. In such districts the peace voters might make the incumbent or a strong candidate jump even if they could not replace him with their own man.

The problem with this theory, of course, begins when the price for peace-bloc support is agreement to policies which alienate larger blocs. An example of its abuse was seen in the 8th and 9th Congressional Districts of North Carolina, where Negro leaders, rather than aiming at a two-party South, urged their people to vote for conservative, segregationist Democrats in close races with conservative, segregationist Republicans on the theory that the winning Democrats, recognizing that their margin of victory came from the Negro, would support the President on civil rights. But what would happen to the larger Southern white bloc after the Congressman had voted for civil-rights legislation? Clearly, the interest of the politician lies in remaining unresponsive even to a crucial Negro bloc except when everyone can be pleased at once. This problem applies equally to peace politics. If not related to an intensive and prolonged program for changing the attitude of the general public, small peace "pressure blocs" will not work wonders on Congress—unless the bloc grows immensely bigger than the peace movement seems able to make it.

Voters for Peace never reached a point where that problem concerned them. They had another: how to build such a bloc with which to influence incumbents. Paradoxically, the answer seemed to be running candidates against unsympathetic incumbents in order to demonstrate strength for next time (if strength there was), or to rally voters and workers for the future. Lens and two other VFP candidates ran as independents.

Unfortunately, in Lens's district, blocs would not make a difference; the incumbent had won by 50,000 votes in 1960. Worse, he was Barratt O'Hara, the most liberal of Chicago's Congressmen, a man Lens could take no pleasure in unseating. For VFP, the presence of a good but cautious liberal like O'Hara posed the challenge to the political hopes of the peace movement in its starkest form. Must basic points of opposition to the arms race give way before the demands of domestic liberalism? O'Hara was undeniably good on labor and welfare causes, had been one of the six Congressmen to vote against the appropriation for the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1961, and had supported the Peace Corps and worked actively for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. On the other hand, he was an Administration man who would not take a position opposing the White House lest he lose influence. He voted for all major military bills, extension of the draft, military foreign aid and the amendment to increase the current military allotment by $200 million, and all of the basic defense appropriation bills. Worst of all, he favored the nuclear-testing program and supported the shelter program.



Lens had no chance to run against O'Hara in the Democratic primary because of the early filing date in Illinois. (VFP, like all the peace-politics groups except PAX in New England, was formed during the spring of 1962.) If Lens were successful in drawing many votes, therefore, he would merely put a right-wing Republican into the seat. Perhaps the decision was made easier by the size of O'Hara's 1960 plurality; but before Lens and two other VFP House candidates were ruled off the ballot, it appeared that VFP could do considerable damage by drawing away some O'Hara precinct workers. The old Congressman and liberal leaders of the 2nd District were clearly disturbed at this prospect, and for a brief moment there was a gratifying response: thirteen prominent Democrats of the district, most of whom disapproved of Lens's candidacy, sent O'Hara a telegram urging him to declare his opposition to further nuclear testing and his support of a gradual, phased reduction of the arms budget.

Lens, to his credit, agreed to withdraw from the race if these two minimal points were met, but O'Hara stalled until past the filing deadline. Lens was forced to file, and subsequently to battle in the courts for his right to be on the

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ballot without the requisite number of signatures (on the grounds that redistricting had made the number uncertain). O'Hara's strategy did not win him any affection among the peace-oriented liberals of Chicago, and although the city-wide Independent Voters of Illinois supported O'Hara, some IVI officials worked for Lens and helped him with the court case. In fact, the Fifth Ward IVI, in the University district which is the core of IVI strength in the city, had to be overruled by the city-wide organization after it had resolved to designate Lens and O'Hara as equally qualified so that its workers could support either.

But at the same time, Lens's willingness to jeopardize one of the ablest liberals in Congress won him little affection among Chicago liberals and officials of the labor movement. Lens was aware of the problem: "Sure, this creates divisions. It's a dangerous thing and we may be making a mistake. We're going after a fairly good liberal here, and the only thing is that he won't break with the Establishment. But then, that's the big thing, isn't it?"

In the opinion of some professionals in peace education, it was not. Many, such as the leaders of Turn Toward Peace and SANE, believed that the peace movement's task is to work with liberal groups long enough to lead them out of the embrace of the Administration on matters of defense policy. Voters for Peace may have lost its chance to do so in Chicago. Not only IVI but Lens's colleagues in the labor movement and the older peace movement were badly split on the merits of the effort. His own and other VFP tactics angered many who should have been its allies. In the two remaining districts, where independent write-in candidates were run, the interviews which VFP held with both candidates before refusing them support were conducted a bit like military inquisitions, the interviewers hewing closely to a demanding set of policy proposals and all but insisting that the Democratic candidates declare their opposition to the President on many vital matters. One candidate with a tough district was anxious to get workers and requested a second chance after failing his first "exam." At the next session, he showed signs of having read Blackett and Melman, but the eternal questionnaire was pressed on him in such a way, by some reports, as to force him to disagree. Thus an opportunity was passed by to influence and develop a possible winner and Robert Cosbey was run against him.

Perhaps it was a case of adhering to the check list too strictly—a mistake that only experience and a dose of pragmatism could have corrected. But one can also sympathize with VFP activists who were asked to pour time, money and shoe leather into campaigns on the basis of off-the-cuff agreements, "in principle" concurrences and a few good sentiments. Uninformed politicians do not inspire issues-oriented people. Some will respond to patient briefings, but it is slow work with few immediate returns. One of VFP's explicit goals was public education, and it appeared at the time that they could get more said to people in their district with their own candidate speaking their own message.

In retrospect, it seems that one of VFP's problems, one widely shared with other peace groups, was having two incompatible purposes: exerting pressure on candidates and incumbents, and educating the voting public by inserting issues into the campaigns. Another was their failure to recognize the kinds of pressure and influence available to them, focusing, perhaps too early, on political pressure of the least subtle sort — voter strength — without any clear prospect of achieving it. A third was to alienate some of the groups it would need to gain such strength in the long run.

Paradoxically, this least compromising of peace-political organizations also gave financial aid to a Democratic candidate in the 14th District (a semi-rural district west of Chicago) who was among the most cautious of all "peace candidates." Jerome Ziegler, an old friend of Lens who had long worked with the Chicago American Friends Service Committee, concluded early in his campaign that politics and peace education were not at all as "inextricably interwoven" as VFP believed them to be.

Although his name appeared among the sponsors of Voters for Peace, Ziegler made no call for any of the proposals in the VFP platform. Nominated by the regular Democratic Party organization in a newly reorganized district, he refused to jeopardize his chances by making an educational effort. In part it was a matter of time. Ziegler aimed to meet a thousand people a day for the last ninety days of his campaign. "I can only spend a few seconds with each person, and there is simply not time for education. The most I can hope to do is to identify myself with some good cause in the right direction." But his reluctance to get into the tangled web of foreign and defense policy was also related to his conviction that peace groups make a mistake in talking slogans rather than events and specific issues with which people can identify. He felt that by discussing the Peace Corps and getting across the spirit it represents he could make at least as many points about international reconciliation that an audience might carry away with them as he could have by discussing initiatives, as H. Stuart Hughes did in Massachusetts.

Ziegler lost; his opponent's plurality of 63.8 per cent in 1960 was cut to 60 per cent, but the addition of Will County to Ziegler's district may account for that. None the less, he doubts that he would have spent his energies more fruitfully running an educational campaign on the VFP or the New England model. In any case, to do so would have contradicted his sense of responsibility to the party which nominated and helped him. Ziegler stressed the problem that once people like himself go into party politics seriously, they take on responsibilities to others who may not share their views.

There are both gains and losses in such a course. The apocalyptic sense which compels the peace movement could be silenced by politics as usual, and this would be a serious loss. Ziegler's kind of politics offers an experience which the peace movement needs. One cannot watch the serious candidates like Ziegler, O'Connell, Brown or Blaine Whipple of Oregon without coming away with a certain respect for the awful rigors of democratic politics. A Congressional race is, on the one hand, a silly, superficial sort of popularity contest which makes fearsome demands upon the endurance of the candidate; but on the other, it is a programed con-

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tact with the mood and concerns of the people that cannot be had in any other pursuit. Such experience could be an antidote to the tendency, characteristic of peace groups, to over-polarize the community, as well as to over-optimism. It is also an education in the ways of power and influence in our society, a lesson that leads many to cynicism but a few to a rare ability to do good.

In the opinion of George Brown, whose victory in California is the primary source of hope to the new insurgents, the peace movement badly needs to learn that neither social change nor attitude change are simple matters:

> *Ray* [Sebens, Brown's campaign manager] *and I have a hell of a job educating the peace groups. I've been in peace work longer than most of them* [Brown is one of the founders of the Friends Committee on Legislation and has long been active in the War Resisters League and the Fellowship of Reconciliation] *and I want them to learn the complexity and depth of the problems. Now they have awakened to these problems and want to do something big. Some of them want to take credit for electing me to Congress. I want them to know this didn't come about so simply. They have to learn politics from the bottom up, and what it is to be a politician, and how to build their own politicians.*

Most of the peace groups that entered the political arena in 1962 have concluded pretty much the same thing. In California, due in part to Brown's urging, the Californians for Liberal Representation will try to find persons with political potential and develop them as candidates from the city councilman level upward, so as to give them political roots. Voters for Peaceful Alternatives, the group in Ithaca, N. Y., which ran Professor Harrop Freeman for Congress, has also resolved to work on a local level. The debate is now whether to aim at capturing the stagnant Democratic Party machinery by finding people to run for town committees or to build the Liberal Party.

In Massachusetts, the disappointing showing of Stuart Hughes has led his campaign organization and the PAX organization from which it emerged into a similar train of thought. Their effort will now be to hold together the considerable network of town coordinators, workers and donors that the state-wide campaign developed, and make it a recruiting ground for town committee and state legislature candidates aiming at having good people ready for the primaries in 1964. The interim activity designed by Campaign Manager Jerome Grossman to keep the organization active and increase its role in the political life of the state, and to "wean" the organization from the attractive and highly popular figure of Hughes himself, consists of state legislative

"Is that some sort of status symbol?"

action—the introduction of bills into the legislative session written by the Hughes campaign organization, making use of the right of petition and the help of interested legislators.

The Chicago VFP organization also intends to involve itself further in traditional politics the next time around. It is aware that by beginning too late to enter the primaries, it missed its best opportunities for improving community contacts and having political effect. Its main effort in 1963 will be to develop promising political material and to enter the primaries of both parties as a disciplined caucus.

There is other evidence of a willingness to attempt a more organic growth and careful allocation of energies. In Ann Arbor, Michigan, a student-faculty group supported a local Democrat with good instincts but little substance in foreign-policy matters. By working closely with him and securing expert academic aid for him on policy proposals, they managed to insert the issue of peace, disarmament and economic reconversion into his campaign. (The candidate lost, but by no more than he had two years previously.) Research being conducted by Students for a Democratic Society (led by the Michigan group) and other organizations promises to locate a number of Congressional districts where such effort may show results. Projects are also under way in Massachusetts and elsewhere to measure the effectiveness with which issues were presented.

All this cautious resolve will amount to nothing, however, if the message of peace politics continues to seem basically wrong to most Americans. In the thirties many flirted with socialism from hunger, anger or because it was intellectually attractive. It had a dynamic and a vision of the future as well as of how to get there. How much of this can be said for the cause of the new insurgents?

On election eve, when the returns were coming in from all over Massachusetts, there was a particular misery in them for a few people in the Hughes campaign like Chester Hartman, who had directed the earlier, vastly successful signature campaign which gathered more than 147,000 signatures to put Hughes on the ballot. Hartman knew the precincts by heart, and he noticed that it was frequently in the precincts most heavily canvassed that Hughes made the poorest showing. The negative correlation was most pronounced in lower-income precincts and disappeared or reversed as the income and education level rose.

Hartman pursued the question of impact with a telephone poll which further revealed the difficulties of delivering a complex issue in politics. It was as Ziegler might have predicted. Nine out of ten persons called had heard of Hughes, but some of them had to be pushed: "Who ran for Senate?" "Lodge and Kennedy." "Was there anybody else?" "Oh yes, Hughes. . . ." In a lower-income precinct, however, few had heard of Hughes, even after a campaign costing nearly $150,000. When asked what they liked about Hughes—most who knew of him liked him—the respondents listed personal qualities: honesty, courage, personality, "a professor." Few mentioned issues. Just over half the respondents knew that Hughes had a platform concerned with disarmament, but most of these knew only labels. They considered his views "nice but impractical," "visionary," "way out," "twenty years ahead of his time,"

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those of a "dreamer." Interestingly, India was mentioned as a factor discrediting Hughes more than Cuba; for although Hughes is not a pacifist he was associated with pacifism because he opposed war, and India's need to fight against China was said to prove him wrong.

With such results, the handwriting was on the wall. Hughes was as articulate a spokesman as the peace movement would ever find, and while his somewhat donnish appearance may have contributed to these results, it was hard to avoid the conclusion that the issues themselves were to blame — unpopular, unpleasant, touching on deep sources of anxiety, in some way they seemed to be their own obstruction.

In part, being "Independent" was a hindrance. Whatever the corruption and nepotism of the two parties, the poll showed that it seemed worse to be outside the system, particularly after Cuba. Hughes himself had recognized the extent to which this disrupted communication long before his organization did. Often, after shaking hands through a factory and being well received, as was usually the case, he would think to himself, "Well, there are two or three more votes—maybe," while his aides made rosy predictions. After the election, he advised SANE not to encourage further independent candidacies like his own unless all possibilities for supporting a party man were exhausted.

The basic problem was not in being an independent candidate but in saying what Hughes said. The defeat of the O'Connell campaign, the most outspoken of all the regular party campaigns, well staffed with peace-movement and other volunteers, operating in a district newly favorable since redistricting, came as a harsh surprise to most observers. Those running the campaign blamed the issues themselves. This is the hard lesson. To build from the bottom as the peace movement now intends, it will be necessary to confront as never before the basic unpopularity of the cause — and more than that, to do something about it.

This unpopularity is no news to the old peace movement, but politics is no place for people who readily accustom themselves to being in a losing minority, and the new activists of the peace campaigns will not rest easily with the popular verdict. The question of how far to accommodate to popular attitudes will therefore be an increasing source of tension within the movement.

What I have called "peace people" and "peace groups" are in almost all cases not old-line pacifists or seasoned dissenters. They are unhappy outside the system of accepted values. They are liberals who most properly should be called peace-concerned, not pacifistic. They want to change the trend of events, to find alternatives to military solutions, to calm the hysterias of the cold war, but not to dump weapons in the sea all at once. Only the failure of the Kennedy Administration to change the trend towards militarization alienates them from the Democratic Party; if things were moving in a hopeful direction, most of them would return to the fold. With few exceptions, their candidates demanded only such hopeful steps as ending testing, strengthening the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, beginning serious study of the economics of disarmament and — where they went at all into the specifics of defense policy (as did Hughes) — opposing counterforce doctrine. Most accepted the need, at least for the time being, of a minimum deterrent nuclear capability. This was a significant break from the policies of the older peace movement, and one still not accepted by many community peace organizations.

In short, much of the traditional pacifist peace movement that knows, perhaps too well, how to live with failure was not active in the campaigns. The ranks were filled with the new peace movement which SANE was first to develop: a middle-class, college-educated, issues-concerned rank and file reminiscent of the Stevenson troops of 1952 and 1956. The hardest work was done by the women's groups and by students, with support from young professional and academic men. The trajectory of these people has been rapid, from apathy through signing protests to demonstrations to political action. Each stage had its rapid disillusionments, and the danger is that the disappointments of politics and the realization of the size of the task ahead may propel them on into cynicism on the one hand, or by the persuasion of numbers, to doubt their own cause on the other. The new peace movement is not inured to failure, nor should it be; yet, to an extent, it has to be.

The early signs after the elections were favorable. After a few weeks of dejection following November 6, a surprising number of campaign workers bounced back into meetings to plan how to keep their organizations functioning and make use of what they had learned ("how not to spend money," as a coordinator put one of the chief lessons). A graduate student at Cornell who had done the hard, door-to-door precinct work of Freeman's campaign in the small cities of New York's 33rd District summed up the hopeful side of the experience for a campus political magazine: "There are many who go to rallies, to Washington and New York. It is not so much fun to go door to door; it's not a social event to the tune of folksongs. Guitars are to be left at home. It's hard work, and a day of campaigning means ten hours. But it is rewarding, and it works."

But many will ask: does it? It works to overcome the campaign worker's sense of political alienation, but what else? Freeman's was perhaps the most successful independent campaign (Liberal Party support in upstate New York means nothing more than a place on the ballot) in terms of injecting the issues of disarmament and reconversion into political discourse. He was invited to all gatherings where the Democratic and Republican candidates were to be heard, and usually succeeded in making them look pale and ill-informed on foreign policy. The regulars were forced to discuss Freeman's issues and insist that they were for peace too. Furthermore, Freeman's showing in the Democratic primary, which he lost very closely, shook the Democratic leaders of Elmira and Binghamton who had been drifting along in the profit-by-losing pattern so often found among minority party politicians with a little urban strength and a federal Administration of their party.

But only extremely sophisticated techniques of analysis could determine whether or not the campaign had changed the politics of the district for the future or softened the ground for new ideas in foreign

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and defense policy. Aside from identifying allies around the district, no early gains were discernible.

Before the campaign, many of these people showed signs of having thought about forming a third party: but the way they showed it is by insisting that that is not their intention, that they intended to work within the two-party system. Some said this because they were Democrats and had hopes for reforming their party (in the South, this is a nearly total distraction among peace and civil-rights advocates), some because they wanted to retain leverage on both parties by entering primary fights, and some because the experience of 1948 taught them that it is a mistake for many reasons to form a party too soon. The rejection of third-party plans was even more pronounced after the election. This is probably just as well, for the third-party effort of the thirties broke up over the prospect of throwing the election of 1936 to a Republican President: because it had aimed too high for what its people were ready to dare, it fell apart.

None the less I think it safe, in spite of their disclaimers, to call the veterans of the peace campaigns a third force at this point. They have not evaporated since the elections, and the trend of their thought is toward avoiding commitments or alliances with either party, even though it is also toward working with party candidates. This edging away from the kind of commitment which characterized the older club movements is true even where ties to the Democratic Party have been strongest and most rewarding, as in California.

The likelihood is that "leakage groups" will form to catch those who find themselves edged out of the system. Their structure and methods will be fluid, and they will "flow" to whatever candidate or tactic promises them increased effectiveness. In the process they may begin to operate in a "professional" manner, ready to make deals or apply pressure and to play the same games the pros play with skill and without rancor. The California club movement is already confronting the need to do this. As one officer of the CDC put it, only half jokingly: "We were dealt out of the L. A. County Committee by paper clubs, maybe we will have to build a few paper clubs of our own." Means unquestionably matter to men like Hefner and Hughes, but there are a lot of tactical lessons short of dishonesty and manipulation that can be learned.

Not only do peace people in politics recognize themselves increasingly as outside the parties, but, unlike the liberal reform movements of New York and Chicago, their groups are linked: intellectually by sharing a primary concern with national policy, and physically



by informal communications networks: newsletters, SANE personnel, occasional conferences and organizations such as the Committee of 1,000 and the Council for Abolishing War formed to raise and distribute campaign funds.

This "third force" quality is an uncertain trend, however. The internal debate between those who hope to establish a role for themselves within the traditional parties, at some cost in "ideological clarity," and those who value this clarity above all, will not quickly be resolved.

Many are certain that the hope of politics lies in reforming the parties. They may be right; but they must ask themselves how the struggle for "citizen" politics will fare against the professionalization of the activists as they move up in the party as CDC's former leaders have. They will be racing against the new national machine which Kennedy is building to replace the dying city machines, a machine of which Jesse Unruh is a characteristic "new man." They must be aware that the effort to work as a caucus within the old parties may be doomed to perpetual frustration by the President's famous victories and the "restriction by partial incorporation" which perpetually undercuts the foreign-policy Left. And they must recognize that most real candidates will go Ziegler's way, staying respectable and supporting the President; that the President's strongest point with the voters, on which the candidate will differ at greatest peril to his electoral chances, is foreign policy, the one place where the peace groups will most want criticism; and that if their men win they will go to Washington with obligations to the Administration and to crucial war-economy elements at home which will further mute their critical stance.

Are they then right who, like Hughes or Lens, insist that only a politics not committed to winning, a politics based on the young and what Lens calls the "left-outs" (those who have a sense of having lost their vote in the direction of domestic and foreign policy) can retain the clarity to contribute a new position to our political dialogue? This is the politics of losing so familiar to the Left and unpalatable to the new insurgents. Its danger is that, never needing to compromise, it falls into sectarian bickering over fine points of theory. If the "leakage groups" lose contact with the major parties, they run this risk.

At the moment, then, the debate comes down to this: will it be necessary over the next decade to try once again to reconstruct democracy within the parties on the lowest level, as reformers have repeatedly tried to do, and thus to battle head-on the accelerating trend toward centralized policy formation? Or must the peace movement build from small beginnings and early disappointments a new force with a radically critical program which links the problem of cold-war escalation to the organic problems of the domestic society and economy as no standard politician can dare to do? In a way it comes down to whether one believes in power or in ideas. The question was not resolved in 1962, but fortunately, it did not have to be. The political insurgency of the peace movement has the benefit of a pragmatism new to the American Left which may enable it to unite many who would fall apart over this question. The decision can be supended for some time to come.

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Kennedy: Profile of a Technician . . . Ted Lewis

Washington, D.C.

For two years now, President Kennedy has been an activist, displaying his managerial and manipulation techniques in almost every facet of goverment. As a result, the public knows a lot about the President's techniques of leadership and yet paradoxically little about the direction in which he is moving or how he will act when obstacles confront him.

Normally our Presidents, after two years in office, become more or less stereotyped in the public mind; it has always been fairly clear how they would act in any given situation. It is uniquely different today as Kennedy enters his third year in office. It should be possible, but it isn't, to say that he is a strong President, or that he is developing into one; or, perhaps, that he is an energetic President who applies his energies unpredictably. With Kennedy, all such estimates are hazardous, at best. His record shows that he displays power, sometimes ruthlessly, in facing up to one problem, and then meets another with caution and uncertainty.

Any examination of his operations to date suggests the basic reason for the fog over the Kennedy image. His methods and style vary, and the unfortunate impression is left that they vary with the economic, political and global climate. This flexibility suggests to some the lack of deep-rooted political ideals and purposefulness in connection with domestic policy. More serious is the effect of his apparent opportunism in the foreign-affairs arena. Even the simplest pronouncement by the President on a cold-war policy problem raises doubts abroad whether it carries the conviction of real intentions.

This is the price that Kennedy is paying for his manipulation techniques—some of them devious.

The Cuba crisis operation certainly showed that the President could move with power and daring. But the real significance of this grave crisis has never been properly emphasized. This centers on one fact—that in twenty-one previous months of dealing with Nikita Khrushchev, the President had failed to convince Moscow that he would stand firm when the issue of a nuclear war was posed starkly.

Could it be that Kennedy's flexible style in handling his Presidential responsibilities both on the home front and in dealings with our own allies contributed to Khrushchev's need to try to solve the Kennedy enigma? Why else were the Soviet missiles and bombers placed in full view in Cuba? By forcing the issue, Khrushchev was finding out what he wanted to know about Kennedy—and, incidentally, what the American people were even more desirous of knowing.

Cuba provided solid evidence, then, as to how the President would act in a grave international emergency. There are few sound clues to be found in his record as to how he will respond in any particular domestic home crisis, big or minor. His rhetoric—inspirational as it often is— is of scant help, for too often he has followed tough talk by accepting compromise. At various times, and under varying conditions, he has displayed great impetuosity, an excess of caution and both impatience and admirable perseverance.

One of the keenest inquirers into the Kennedy *modus operandi* is probably James MacGregor Burns of Williams College. In his friendly but penetrating 1960 political biography, *John Kennedy: A Political Profile*, Burns predicted that Kennedy, if elected, would

> *. . . mobilize traditional tools of Presidential power and use them with force, astuteness and tenacity. He would show a flair for personal influence and manipulation, perhaps some of the flair Roosevelt had. He would drive hard bargains, forming alliances with Republicans when necessary, but compromising too, when he lacked the votes.*

This was perspicacious forecasting. Yet it is not so much the President's personalized methods of operating as it is the complex nature of his personality and the uncertainty as to his goals that disturb the American people, even those — and they are in the majority—who admire and support him. His motives, in any given situation, are becoming more and more suspect. This is already developing as a political problem, although it is clearly one the Democratic Party is going to have to live with as long as Kennedy is in office.

Consider, for example, the questions being raised around the country: Why is the President unwilling to take on Congress and go to the people for support of the social-reform and other "forward looking" domestic measures he once considered vitally needed? Is there still something about the Cuba crisis we haven't been told about? Have we been playing British politics with the Skybolt missile? Will Kennedy really make a fight to get the new Congress to act on medicare and education aid? Or will he go all out only to get passage of his tax-cut—tax-reform program?

This questioning state of mind often breeds ugly suspicions. Hence, for example, the whispers that the President and his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, are pursuing a personal vendetta against Jimmy Hoffa, the Teamster boss. Hence the suspicion that the President, while appearing the essence of frankness, is actually quite a conniver, *vide* the Adlai Stevenson affair. Hence the Republican-fed report that Kennedy timed the Cuban missile crisis for just before the November elections.

The examples could be multiplied many times. The President, however, appears impervious to these widely aired suspicions. He obviously remains supremely confident of his standing with the American public.

In the view of some liberals, the fairly widespread wonder as to what really goes on in Washington is founded on loss of faith in the President's political philosophy. Kennedy won the election in 1960 as a liberal. He has since performed as a middle-of-the-road progressive. The view of the Democratic Party expressed by White House aide and historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., probably comes closest to revealing what the party is up to as it functions here under Kennedy. The party, wrote Schlesinger in *The Politics of Hope*, is "humane, skeptical and pragmatic . . . has no dogma, no sense of Messianic mission, no belief that mortal man can attain

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Utopia, no faith that fundamental problems have final solutions."

A President subscribing generally to that belief would operate about as Kennedy has. He has Republicans high in his Administration like Treasury Secretary Dillon and Defense Secretary McNamara, on whom he counts for advice. He keeps on friendly terms with those in Congress, like Senator Harry F. Byrd (D., Va.), who oppose virtually all bills embodying the party's national economic and social philosophy as espoused by Kennedy in the 1960 campaign.

The liberal disillusionment with Kennedy of 1963 is, of course, one factor responsible for the questions constantly raised as to the President's motivations. In this connection, there is an interesting off-beat estimate which suggests that, under Kennedy, a vacuum on Democratic Party issues exists in Washington. It comes from Maurice Rosenblatt, chairman of the Board of Advisers of the National Committee for an Effective Congress. Rosenblatt had this to say about the President:

> *One of the accepted generalities or clichés of our time is that he [Kennedy] is a master politician. He certainly is a master at election politics, at getting elected. But what we say is that he needs to use more of the arts of persuasion and more of the arts of politics to get his program through [Congress].*

Rosenblatt said that while historically the Democratic Party was able to create issues very well, it has been a long time since it did so. He credited Eisenhower with making the last two big issues—that of the balanced budget and inflation. And he did so by carrying his cause to the people; as a result, his "message" got through to Congress.

Kennedy's refusal to use his popular leadership to put national pressures on Congress rankles with the reformist element in his party. But in true pragmatist fashion, Kennedy says he is convinced he can fare better working with Congress than by fighting it. This wheeling and dealing with the legislators is one of Kennedy's most intricate techniques. His wheel horse in this operation is his legislative lieutenant, Lawrence O'Brien; but the Chief Executive is always battle-available, making personal phone calls to Capitol Hill as he practices the soft art of persuasion.

The dealing is occasionally of precinct-politics character: a suggestion that defense contracts may be at stake, or that patronage may be frozen; or a reminder that the President is most likely to find time to campaign in behalf of a Senator or Representative who votes "right."

Not all of the pressures come from the White House; they can come from the Administration's leaders in Congress. But with the President and the White House staff in the thick of the operations, one assumes that the pressures originate with the Chief Executive.

This manipulating method of dealing with Congress is the basis for the suspicion that the President moves in similar devious ways in all other affairs of state. The reasoning is unfortunate. Dealing with a recalcitrant Congress, particularly one dominated by one's own party, presents a problem wholly different from that posed by world and domestic issues not subject to the legislative mill.

When a critical decision must be reached at his own official family level, the President's technique is something else again, although the technique may vary from issue to issue. On cold-war problems, he is an inveterate brain-picker, using those whose grasp of the situation, and willingness to propose and defend effectively the solution they favor, he has learned to respect. It would be almost axiomatic, therefore, should a crisis of the order of Cuba develop again, that he would move toward his own decision by listening to men like Dean Acheson, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Dillon, Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, his brother Robert and, of course, his own national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy. Secretary of State Dean Rusk's absence from this list should be noted. What Rusk thinks, he would keep to himself, as he wants to be in a position to carry out loyally whatever decision Kennedy makes.

Sometimes, of course, a major issue involves the jurisdiction of both the Executive Branch and of Congress. This, in the past, has called for a different managerial technique. Kennedy has shown himself at his most skillful in this type of operation. In the last Congress, Kennedy succeeded in bringing about passage of the important tariff-reduction act aimed at fitting the United States into the trade pattern of the developing European Community. Name Republicans like former Secretary of State Christian Herter were called in as high-level lobbyists. Key public-relations men from private industry were "loaned" to the White House to make the build-up effective.

The same sort of elaborate selling job will be done on the new Congress to get the tax-cut program through, with Republican talent carefully brought into the act along with respected business leaders.

Where the White House technique has fumbled—and is likely to do so again—will be generally in ac-

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tions taken on the domestic scene in which the President and the Attorney General find themselves involved together. This has been particularly true in the Administration's attempt to "manage" the news. It is natural, of course, for the Administration to be open and aboveboard with the communications media when it has nothing to hide, i.e., when the White House considers that it has handled a problem adroitly and successfully. But when there has been a failure, the trap door on "authoritative" information is slammed shut, as after the Cuban invasion fiasco of April, 1961. Or, as in the University of Mississippi story, the media are used to cover mistakes.

In Mississippi, there had been pre-crisis negotiations by telephone with Governor Ross Barnett of a nature suggesting that Attorney General Kennedy actually thought that he could persuade the arch-segregationist to fall in line—and stay there. There was also the highly questionable final decision to send federal marshals into Oxford first, not troops.

Except in the South, the whole nasty episode receded in public interest with the Cuban crisis of late October. But last month it was revived in an "authoritative" *Look* magazine article that carried the imprint of helping Administration hands. Why? News management again: to convince the public that the Barnett-Bobby Kennedy phone talks made sense—which they never did and never will.

The Administration's management of the news *after* the Cuban crisis was more disturbing to many people than the controls exercised during the crisis itself. This involved "authoritative" revelations of what supposedly went on in the secret sessions of the National Security Council. And more recently there has been the questionable news management of the Cuban prisoner-ransom deal. Once the prisoners had been returned and American reaction was highly favorable, it suddenly developed that the deal had been masterminded by Robert F. Kennedy, not lawyer James B. Donovan, though that certainly had not been the impression given the public earlier.

Undeniably, the President's overall handling of his office has been unusually controversial. On the other hand, few Presidents in our history have been subjected to so close a day-in, day-out scrutiny. This was in part because of Kennedy's comparative youth and the great national interest in how he would sail the ship of state. But there was something more. Kennedy followed Eisenhower and whipped Nixon to gain office. The man he succeeded in the White House had occupied the Presidency for eight years. Eisenhower was a most undevious character; his every move was easily comprehended, almost predictable. Those who know him say that he had neither the capacity nor the inclination for intrigue. Then, in 1960, Kennedy campaigned against Nixon, who had already established a reputation for deviousness—"Tricky Dick," many people called him. By comparison Kennedy, despite his admitted mental ability, seemed simple and disarming—ironically, more in the mold of Eisenhower than was Nixon.

So, once elected, Kennedy's frequent use of intricate, usually skillful but occasionally devious, techniques came as a surprise to his supporters and was disconcerting to many of them. James MacGregor Burns, in his new book, *The Deadlock of Democracy*, cautiously implies a little disillusionment on his own part. Referring to the trouble met by the Administration's proposals in the 1962 Congress, he said the difficulties "aroused complaints by some liberals that the Administration lacked a central purpose of vision or grand design, that it had bent before every gust of public opinion instead of coming to grips with its enemies, that the Augustan age of poetry and power forecast by Robert Frost had become a managerial age of empty rhetoric and manipulation." Burns somewhat softly gives it as his opinion that these critics underestimate the "centrifugal forces operating on the President and the sheer intractability of the operational problems." But he still thinks there is something to their point of view.

An estimate of the Kennedy operation in the future based on the past still must be highly tenuous. About all that can be guaranteed is that life in these United States, as long as Kennedy is in the White House, is likely to be exciting—and somewhat insecure.

Does the 'Profit Squeeze' Hurt? . . . Peter L. Bernstein

Even though 1962 set an all-time record for corporate profits—about $26 billion after taxes—businessmen were clearly dissatisfied with the results. Complaints about the hard sell, price competition and rising costs were just as frequent and audible as in years when earnings were lower. A typical comment came from one chemical company executive who summed it all up by saying, "Sure, they're new highs, but they're not the kind of highs to reflect the full effort thrown into them."

Complaints about the profit squeeze have been coming along in such profusion and regularity as to give the appearance of a chronic ailment of American business. If so, this is serious. But how valid is the evidence of deteriorating corporate earning power? Even more important, to what extent is the lagging trend in profits causing a similarly sluggish performance by the economy in general and business capital investment in particular?

An impressive array of statistics can be gathered to show that the profit squeeze is a matter of genuine concern. For example, although Gross National Product — that is, the nation's total output of goods and services — has increased by 120 per cent since the early postwar years of 1947-49, corporate profits before taxes are up only 67 per cent. This lag has become increasingly noticeable in recent years: profits have risen only 11

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per cent since 1955, while GNP has climbed about 40 per cent.

A more accurate indication of these trends shows up in the share of corporate output (as contrasted with total output) that has been left over for profits. In 1929, profits before taxes amounted to 19 per cent of corporate gross product; by 1948, the profit share had risen to a little over 21 per cent, as profits expanded faster than output. But by 1957, the profit share was down to 16.5 per cent of corporate gross product, while this past year less than 16 per cent was left over for the owner of corporate business.

While the costs and expenses represented by the earnings of the other factors of production are determined by contract and therefore *must* be paid out by businessmen, profits are a residual item that amount to no more than whatever happens to be left over after everyone else has been paid off. No wonder, then, that the businessman feels jilted by the course of economic events when he sees his sales rising, his employees, creditors, landlord and government agencies all receiving more dollars from him, while the last line on his profit and loss statement stubbornly refuses to follow along the upward path.

Nevertheless, although the squeeze on profits appears to be genuine enough, additional evidence is available to suggest that its intensity has been exaggerated.

In the first place, the stability of corporate earning power in the postwar period has been impressive. This means that the *average* level of profits has been higher than it might have been if profit trends had been more volatile. While profits before taxes dropped from $9.6 billion in 1929 to a loss figure of $3.0 billion only three years later, and while they fell by about a third during the recession of 1937-38, the sharpest *postwar* decline was only 20 per cent (1949). In fact — and this is important in view of the increasing frequency of business complaints about inadequate earning power — the decline in profits during the most recent recession (1960-61) was so brief and so shallow that earnings of $46.1 billion before taxes for the year 1961 as a whole were above 1960's showing and were exceeded only by 1959's record of $46.8 billion.

Second, profits have been repressed much more by competitive pressures on selling prices, due to excess capacity and inadequate demand, than by rising costs. On the contrary, business firms have done an extraordinarily impressive job of controlling their cost structure. Manufacturing production, for example, has clearly risen faster than wage and salary disbursements. Labor costs per unit of output moved downward all during 1962 and had, in fact, been moving in that direction ever since the early part of 1961. At the end of 1962, this ratio was at the lowest point it had reached in more than five years. This was in sharp contrast to normal experience, for labor costs usually move upward much faster than production in the latter stages of business expansion.

Third, the proof of every pudding is in the eating, and corporate stockholders surely have no grounds for complaint: dividends have been rising steadily for fifteen years. The contrast with prewar experience is significant here, too. In 1933, dividends were little more than a third of what they had been in 1929; the drop from 1937 to 1938 amounted to 32 per cent; the 1929 level of dividend payments set a record that was not surpassed for seventeen years.

Ever since 1946, however, dividends have risen every year (except for a negligible decline of 2 per cent during the Korean War under the impact of the excess-profits tax). In fact, dividends have risen at a rate that exceeds the rate of increase in compensation of employees. Dividend payments ($16 billion in 1962) had doubled in thirteen years and tripled since the end of the war. In contrast to total profits, the share of corporate output going to dividends has increased since 1957.



The real villain of the piece is a technical bookkeeping gadget known as depreciation. Since this is something that most laymen don't really understand, its impact has been minimized or rationalized to an extent that disguises its central role in this entire argument about corporate earning power.

Depreciation is an accounting concept to show how much plant and equipment a business firm has used up in the process of producing goods and services during some given period of time. Of course, payment for factories and other capital goods is made when the equipment is acquired. However, since the equipment will provide a stream of productive services over an extended period of time, it would be inaccurate to charge off the entire cost against the output of the year in which it is installed. On the contrary, a portion of the original cost is charged off each year that the equipment helps to produce goods and services for sale, as a contribution to the costs of that year's production. In every sense of the word, depreciation is a proper cost of doing business — it reflects the capital equipment used up in the process of production in the same way that wages reflect the labor power that is used up.

Its impact on the firm, however, is fundamentally different. Wages are a drain on cash — they must be paid out to the employees. Depreciation, on the other hand, is not an out-of-pocket expense — it merely

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takes account of cash that had been laid out some time in the past when the equipment was originally acquired. This is why we talk about "cash flow," which is the amount of money left over to the business firm from its sales revenues after it has paid all of its out-of-pocket expenses, such as wages, salaries, purchases of parts and materials from other firms, rent, interest and taxes. Cash flow, in brief, is nothing more than net profits plus depreciation.

It is important to remember that depreciation is a cost of production, just like wages or interest. Therefore, the larger the depreciation accrual, the smaller the profits. But the smaller the profits, the smaller the income taxes and the smaller the taxes, the larger the cash flow. And the larger the cash flow, the greater the amount available for dividends and corporate expansion! In short, the larger the depreciation accrual, the more the owners of the company will benefit (and the greater the loss to the government or the greater the burden on other taxpayers who have no capital goods to depreciate on their books).

When we focus our attention on the depreciation item in the corporate earnings statistics, a dramatic picture emerges. Depreciation accruals have doubled since 1953 and tripled since 1948; corporate profits after taxes are up only 45 per cent since 1953 and less than 60 per cent since 1948. In 1962, depreciation charges were almost as large as corporate profits after taxes; in 1949, depreciation had been less than a third of net profits.

This puts the picture in quite a different light. We saw earlier that the profits share of corporate gross product had shrunk steadily and significantly since the war. But if we take corporate cash flow, we find that its share of corporate gross product is approximately the same as it was in 1948 and exactly the same as it was in 1957. (Incidentally, the share of compensation of employees was 63.3 per cent in 1929, 64.0 per cent in 1948, 65.2 per cent in 1957 and 64.0 per cent in 1962, so the cause of the profit squeeze can hardly be found here.) In brief, the declining share of profits is really accounted for by the rising volume of depreciation accruals.

This sharp rise in depreciation comes from a variety of causes. One is the obvious increase in the quantity of capital goods at work in our economy as capacity has expanded over the years: depreciation is directly related to the value of the capital investment of business firms. Furthermore, new capital goods have tended to cost more dollars than the old equipment they replace (although the new equipment is frequently so much more efficient and productive that capital costs *per unit of output* have actually been declining). Finally, but by no means least, revisions in the tax laws have permitted business firms to write off their capital goods at a faster rate than had previously been allowable.

Laws adopted during World War II and during the Korean War, the tax bills of 1954 and 1962 and the recently liberalized regulations of the Internal Revenue Bureau have had a substantial effect on depreciation practices. The result, of course, is lower reported earnings and correspondingly lower tax liabilities. According to a recent analysis by the Commerce Department, corporate profits before taxes in 1962 were about $6-$7 billion lower than they would have been without these legal changes. This is no small matter: the saving in income taxes was equal to 20 per cent of total dividend payments in 1962.

While many businessmen complain about both the profit squeeze *and* about depreciation accruals that are inadequate to cover the cost of replacing worn or obsolete equipment, the statistics suggest no real pressure on corporate finances. Cash flow available to corporations after dividend payments to stockholders has approximately equaled plant and equipment expenditures since 1958. For manufacturing corporations alone, this has been the case for almost ten years. Net new issues of corporate securities show no rising trend and little or no real variations over a period of six years. Indeed, the generosity of management in dividend payments to stockholders is proof that plenty of money is available to finance corporate needs.

One further point in this connection is worth making. A major cause of the profit squeeze has been the excess productive capacity plaguing most industries since the capital-spending binge of 1955-57 expanded output capabilities so far beyond current needs. This hurts because managements want to recoup investments even though plant equipment lie idle — and also because excess capacity leads to price wars (or inability to raise prices) as firms struggle against one another for additional volume.

Businessmen have tried two ways to work their way out of this tangle. One has been to attempt to raise prices even under conditions where supply clearly exceeds demand (the steel fracas of last spring being the most notorious but by no means the only example). The second has been the incessant campaign for a reduction in corporate income taxes, even though a corresponding reduction in government spending could mean a loss of business for many companies.

Both of these campaigns have been designed to make somebody else — customers or other taxpayers — pay for the idle and excess capacity. But it is questionable whether serious management errors in the almost helter-skelter over-expansion of plant capacity during the mid-1950s should be paid for by anyone except the stockholders of the companies in which the mistakes were made. This is the essential principle of a free-enterprise system: the race is to the fastest, while the community has no responsibility for the success or failure of any individual producer. Those who are most vocal in defense of our economic system might do well to consider the extent to which they are presently violating its most fundamental and traditional philosophies.

The real issue is the amount of harm that the profit squeeze is doing to the economy. Here the matter is moot. The evidence is by no means conclusive that the profit squeeze has caused the inadequate rate of economic growth of the past five years or that, in particular, it is responsible for the subnormal portion of our total output that we are now allocating to the accumulation of productive capital goods.

High profits are neither a necessary stimulus nor a prerequisite for an increase in capital outlays. The capital-goods boom of 1955-57 was not preceded by any great bulge in profits. Even though the excess-profits tax was taken off the books in 1954, net profits after taxes in that year were 7 per cent below 1953

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and, with the exception of 1949, were lower than in any year since 1946. Yet, virtually out of the blue, corporate expenditures for plant and equipment rose almost 50 per cent between 1954 and 1957. One could as well argue that the splurge in capital spending contributed to the boom and therefore to the 40 per cent expansion in corporate profits in that three-year period, as to take the more conventional view that the rise in corporate earnings stimulated the increase in capital investment.

In any case, the boom hit a climax in 1957 and has been followed ever since by a generally flat trend in business investment and by a marked slow-down in our rate of economic growth. Yet trends in business spending for plant and equipment have perhaps been better than one might have expected. Instead of the usual collapse in investment that has always followed overheated periods of expansion, outlays for plant and equipment have held at a relatively high level and have been consistently above expenditures for any year prior to 1956. Indeed, the modest decline in this sector during the recession of 1960-61 was less than half as great as it had been during the brief business setback of 1957-58.

What we see, in effect, is the competitive free-enterprise system operating at its very best. The influence of competition within a generally expansionary economic environment has encouraged — one might more accurately say forced — businessmen to spend substantial sums on modernization and cost reduction. Thus, capital spending has been maintained *despite* the prevalence of excess capacity, *despite* a discouraging pattern of growth in demand and *despite* the lag in profits.

The point can be made even more forcefully. The extraordinary ease with which profits could be realized during the free-spending and goods-hungry atmosphere of the early postwar and Korean period led to a capital-spending spree far beyond the necessities of the time. The maladjustments and excesses of that spending spree are still with us: they are at the root of much of our current troubles. But as profits have been harder to come by, businessmen have been forced to maintain their capital outlays in order to keep their costs down and to stay competitive with other firms.

As a result, costs per unit of output have been held in check. We have snuffed out most of the cost-push inflation that plagued us so persistently in previous years. If one of the primary advantages of a free-enterprise competitive system is to deliver the goods at the lowest possible cost, the experience of recent years shows that what is taught in theory can indeed be true in practice. If profits were there for the taking, our cost structure would be far more inflated.

The real problem is that profits are by no means the only symptom of our economy's substandard performance. The profit squeeze is no more important than the employment squeeze, for, like profits, the level of employment has lagged behind the level of production, and unemployment has become an increasingly serious burden.

The fault lies with lack of adequate demand to justify maximum use of our physical productive facilities and of our labor force. Regardless of current profit rates, businessmen would make many more new investments if they believed the customers were there to buy the additional output. But if demand is sluggish, no businessman will risk funds in new ventures that may never pay out.

What all of this adds up to is that the profit squeeze is neither so intense as it has been described nor so disturbing as many have tried to paint it. It has, in fact, pushed costs down to a level where we can look forward to a significant upward surge in profits when business activity in general shows clearer signs of vigor. Lack of sufficient demand due to inadequate purchasing power at low-income levels, and a repressive tax structure at all points of the economy (together with the deflationary influence of economy-minded Congressmen), explain both the pressure on profits and the subdued levels of business investment.

If high profits always led to high levels of business investment, no boom would ever come to an end. The opposite is also true. The stimulus to businessmen's expenditures on plant and equipment comes from anticipation and hopes for higher *future* profits; otherwise we would never have worked our way up out of recession.

(Continued from inside front cover)

his blessing upon the Muse-Karam combine." The fact is neither I nor Harding College has an anti-labor bias at all. (The fact neither endorses Jimmy Hoffa doesn't make them anti-labor.) In the second place, there never was a "Muse-Karam combine." Karam affirms he never even knew Muse and had no association with him. Then *Nation* affirms that I and Karam went to Florida to testify regarding a certain Bill. Actually, neither I nor Karam went to Florida to testify on that Bill or any other Bill.

Nation presents many misrepresentations of the contents of the anti-Communist film, *Communism on the Map*, but *Nation* actually disproves nothing in this widely used anti-Communist educational film.

Harding College is a fully accredited liberal arts Christian college. It is neither "Ultra" nor "extreme." Neither "rightist" nor "leftist." Our research reveals that the "Ultra" label was first applied to Harding College by the well-known Socialist, Norman Thomas, and then by *The Worker*, official Communist publication, and later by *The Nation*. These sources were then copied or imitated in a certain limited number of other publications. I, Harding College and the National Education Program believe in constitutional government, in private ownership of property and in the religion revealed in the Bible. I and they believe in developing patriotic citizenship that will support the constitution of the United States and the faith in God and the private ownership of property which the constitution ordains. Resorting to smear tactics to discredit us because we are anti-Communist is un-American. *George S. Benson*
President, Harding College

His audience

New York City

Dear Sirs: I quote from Hilton Kramer's review of *Les Pavillons* (for which I did the photographs) in your Dec. 22 issue: "Who wants to pay $15 for what is essentially a short magazine piece?" Do you consider 36,000 words a short magazine piece? Next, and I quote again: "There must be an audience for this sort of book that I don't know about." . . . As it's been my pleasant duty to autograph several hundred copies, I feel I can tell your reviewer who the audience is: Queen Mother Elizabeth of England, Mrs. J. F. Kennedy, Mrs. Rose Kennedy, Greta Garbo, the Gilbert Millers, Mrs. Vincent Astor (three copies), Mme. Jacques Balsan (three copies), the Duke of Marlborough, Raymond Loewe, Irene Dunne, Joan Fontaine, Zachary Scott, et al. Also, a garbage collector and a policeman. . . .
Jerome Zerbe

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The Hell of Haiti . . . . . Richard Alexander

Port-au-Prince

"O ma belle Haiti, de tant de maux flétrie!
Helas! helas! pourquoi meurs-tu?
Paul Lochard (1875-1919)

On one side of the Champs-de-Mars in Port-au-Prince stands an old-style building which in its time has played many a part. Its current fashionable operation is proclaimed by a huge sign with the words "Pax Villa." The curious visitor learns that it is a mortuary, complete with slumber rooms, meditation alcoves and other paraphernalia of the Beverly Hills memorial industry. Something new in Haiti — where people have traditionally been buried with fanfare, but without fuss.

Fronting the Champs-de-Mars on another side, in a newer building, is the office of the U.S. Malaria Control Mission, the only form of direct U.S. aid to Haiti that has not been ended. Residents report that despite the efforts of the mission, mosquitoes seem in greater abundance than ever.

It is chillingly appropriate that the third side of the park should be dominated by the gleaming white National Palace, from which Dr. François Duvalier directs the worst regime in Haiti's deplorable history. His contribution to the building is said to be a torture chamber, Trujillo-style—also something new here.

Arrests and disappearances have been commonplaces here since Duvalier's succession five years ago. The operation of his home-made militia and secret police of thugs, the *"Tonton Macoute,"* is notorious. Extortion directed against foreign merchants, when protested by the diplomatic corps led by the British Ambassador, led to the latter's being declared *persona non grata.* Extortion directed against Haitians is, of course, not even protested.

The Vatican, which has already excommunicated the President, has now recalled the Papal Nuncio resident in Haiti in protest against the expulsion of the last bishop on Haitian soil. Many Haitians have taken asylum in various foreign missions.

There is total surveillance of mail. The government is thus completely advised of anything that an individual may choose to commit to paper. The smuggling in and out of personal letters has been detected in customs inspections and made the occasion of arrests and, at least in one case, of the disappearance (and presumed death) of a woman who attempted to send a letter frankly

Richard Alexander is an American with long experience in Haitian affairs.

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describing conditions to her husband, visiting abroad. The *visa de sortie* has been made an instrument of high and low policy. Businessmen, students and technicians have been denied permission to leave the country for a wide variety of reasons or no reasons at all: personal grudges against individuals or families, the "defection" of friends.

Virtually every business is in a state of bankruptcy, as is the government, since the public till functions as the private till of Duvalier and a few chosen cronies. A famed retail establishment now employs less than 10 per cent of the number it employed four years ago. Periodically, the government payroll is simply not met. No payments were made in December to a pension list ranging from $300 a month for an ex-President to 65 cents a month for certain widows.

The government has devised every possible technique for milking the last centime from the country. Special taxes have been imposed on certain foodstuffs through the creation of a distribution monopoly. However, an attempt to impose a tax on the rice sold by individual peasants led to a spontaneous outburst by the women who conduct this commerce (and who net perhaps one or two dollars a week out of it). The tax was suspended. Toll booths have been mounted on all roads; there are three on the road between Port-au-Prince and Petionville, a distance of three miles. The roads, however, are in the same condition they were ten years ago. Finally, a license must be secured for each voodoo ceremony!

Emerging into prominence as the confidential adviser to the President is one Dr. Fourcand, Dean of the School of Medicine, Director of the Department of Social Welfare and Chief of the Morals Police.

Dr. Fourcand initiated in the School of Medicine a loyalty-to-Duvalier oath, a practice now extended to the entire university. The prospective student must, in effect, join the *"Ton-ton Macoute"* (though if he is a mulatto, he need not apply, a result of Duvalier's black factionalism). The Morals Police, whose members ride about in conspicuously marked green vehicles, virtually confines its activities to stopping automobiles driven by upper-class women and threatening them with charges of prostitution, a projection of Duvalier's anti-elite bias. Genuine prostitution, of course, flourishes unabated.

Though the United States is said to be thoroughly disgusted with Duvalier, a detachment of Marines is still assigned here for the purpose of training the Haitian Army, which at best will be used only to terrorize Haitians. Haitians naturally wonder at the *bona fides* of U.S. disgust. They cannot forget that, as a Presidential candidate, Duvalier received the unofficial blessing of U.S. officials in Haiti, as well as the official blessing of unofficial Americans here, including the Protestant bishop, a man now thoroughly reviled in circles both in Haiti and in exile. Therefore, a frequent question is: What does the United States intend to do about this regime? The myth of nonintervention has now completely collapsed as far as the Caribbean is concerned. We have intervened plentifully in Haiti and elsewhere in the past — and in the very recent past, at that. At this point, to do nothing is in itself a mode of intervention both dangerous and irresponsible.

Clearly, the present government of Haiti is the most tyrannous and inhumane in the Caribbean, if not in the hemisphere. The only appropriate action is a U.S.-supported condemnation of the regime by the OAS, with subsequent withdrawal of diplomatic recognition and the imposition of sanctions. Duvalier's fall after such an action would be swift and sure. There could then follow, after a decent interval, OAS supervision of the first really free election in Haiti's history.

Adolf Dehn, American artist whose drawings appear on this and the facing page, has spent much time in Haiti. His work appears in such museums as the Metropolitan, Whitney, Museum of Modern Art, British Museum, etc.

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The Triumph of Survival

ONE DAY IN THE LIFE OF IVAN DENISOVICH. By Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Translated by Ralph Parker. E. P. Dutton & Co. 160 pp. $3.95.

ONE DAY IN THE LIFE OF IVAN DENISOVICH. By Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Translated by Max Hayward and Ronald Hingley. Frederick A. Praeger. 210 pp. $3.95.

Ernst Pawel

Few authors in recent memory have been launched with more fanfare than Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a forty-five-year-old schoolteacher who published his first novel in the November issue of *Novy Mir*, Russia's leading literary magazine. *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, deceptively slim in its outward dimensions, exploded on impact and caused a sensation at home and abroad. A reprint edition of 100,000 copies was sold out at once in Russia, translations in a record number of languages are rolling off the presses both East and West, and here in the United States two publishers are simultaneously bringing out different versions within two months of the original publication—an event certainly without precedent in the annals of American publishing.

No mere greatness can hope to evoke such frenzied attention; and though blurb writers from Moscow to Madison Avenue pay pious tribute to the Tolstoyan vigor of the work, its shock effect is obviously due to causes largely nonliterary, rooted in Soviet politics and cold-war tensions. [See "Letter from Paris" by Alexander Werth, page 104.]

For one thing, the novel is the first extensive account of slave-labor camps in either fact or fiction that has been passed for publication in Russia. Solzhenitsyn, moreover, not only breaks new paths but hacks them out with a ferocious lucidity that is revolutionary in Soviet letters. His prose is a weapon edged with traces of Chekhov and Hemingway; it includes the realistic and explicit use of profanity, another aspect of reality that proletarian writers have not thus far been permitted to acknowledge.

The timing, also, has seemed of consummate significance to Kremlinologists everywhere; they have been quick to interpret *Ivan Denisovich* as part of a new anti-Stalinist offensive in the wake of the Cuban crisis. Khrushchev himself, in fact, is said to have overruled the Central Committee of the Communist Party in clearing the work for publication. Finally, the preface (included in both American volumes) by Alexander Tvardovsky, intrepid editor of *Novy Mir*, a poet and a leader of the "liberal" faction, is seen as holding out the broad promise of a new era in Soviet letters. Tvardovsky intimates that from now on no aspect of Soviet life will be closed to Soviet writers—always provided their creative inquiries result in a work of art. What is or is not art will presumably be determined by the same authorities as heretofore.

It would, however, be unfortunate if politics and publicity conspired to obscure the fact that *Ivan Denisovich* is a masterpiece in its own right, a work squarely in the mainstream of Russia's literary tradition and comparable to some of its greatest examples. It is, of course, a "document of our time"—not merely in the topical sense of "revealing the secrets of Stalin's labor camps," but in the far more profound one of opening new perspectives upon man in the age of total oppression. Much has been published in the West describing these camps and containing authoritative firsthand accounts, often far more ambitious in scope and crammed with the most vivid details. But all of them put together still add up to a sadly inadequate understatement, because the truth about this way of living and of dying remains inaccessible to factual documentation. Solzhenitsyn's story is in a different category altogether; he uses facts, not as an end but as a beginning.

This is his first work in print. But the man from Rostov-on-the-Don, his face hauntingly reminiscent of Camus, is no novice; he served an apprenticeship few writers can match. Biographical data about him are scant, very official, but telling: three years at the front, sudden arrest on a charge of *lèse Stalin*, eight years in forced labor camps, release in 1953 followed by three more years in exile, with final "rehabilitation" in the wake of the 20th Party Congress. The authority of such credentials would seem invulnerable to the clichés of publicity, and repetitive evocations of the young Tolstoy are both tiresome and gratuitous—Solzhenitsyn speaks very much for himself, and in a voice of his own.

At least when he speaks Russian.

The story itself is the meticulous and devastatingly detailed account of a single winter day in the life of a prisoner in a Siberian slave-labor camp. The outward setting—climate, landscape, food, living conditions, camp routine—merges into a brutally impressive vision of hell such as only the artist in the role of insider could hope to convey. It contains much factual information, but to regard *Ivan Denisovich* as merely another exposé of Soviet slave labor is vaguely akin to reading *The Divine Comedy* as a political tract. Even on the level of its purely literal meaning, this is an epic celebrating a great victory and a great hero. The victory is all the more triumphant for being temporary and conditional—a man survives a day in hell and remains human.

It is his portrait of the hero himself that gives the true measure of Solzhenitsyn's mastery. The carpenter Ivan Denisovich Shukhov, ex-kolkhoznik, veteran of front-line combat and of eight years in Siberian camps, comes to life in this short novel with a force elemental in its impact. A Russian, an archetype, symbol of our age, he is above all a human being; in this lies his strength, his weakness and his ultimate greatness. It is both his weapon and his wound.

We first meet him in his bunk at dawn, just before reveille, girding for another round in the endless battle and, without a trace of either pathos or self-pity, evaluating his chances. The odds on this particular day seem against him; for one thing, the night, instead of much-needed rest, had brought an attack of the chills, and every bone in his body achingly resists the demand to get up at five o'clock of an Arctic morning in un-

Ernst Pawel, novelist and translator, is the author of From the Dark Tower *and* In the Absence of Magic *(both Macmillan).*

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heated barracks. He debates the choice —first in a series, and every one of them potentially fatal—between sick call and breakfast.

Sick call is a futile farce. Breakfast, though also farcical—a bowl of watery soup and a crust of bread — is a matter of life and death; each scrap of food is a reprieve. By the time Ivan has fought his way into the mess hall and back out again, we have come to know him not only as an individual but also in his collective personality as a member of Squad 104, a function fully as important. For the squad, that basic contribution of communism to penology, is a collective organism, living, working, eating, sleeping and suffering together in relentlessly enforced symbiosis. Rations, based on work norms, are doled out collectively, so that one man's goldbricking can endanger the lives of his fellows—an arrangement conducive to mutual aid in a manner not dreamed of by Kropotkin. As they stumble out, ill-clad and ill-shod, into the frozen dawn to submit to roll call, inspection, and the long march across the storm-swept ice to their construction site, the squad members emerge as individuals in a series of brilliant portraits that range from old-timers, such as the tough and resourceful squad leader or the Bible-reading Baptist, invulnerable in his sainthood, to the fawning and parasitic ex-bureaucrat and the recently arrived, much decorated naval captain, who is utterly disoriented by his sudden change of status and on the verge of lethal resignation, and whom Ivan is trying to help.

Throughout the book, the angle of vision is that of Ivan Denisovich; it is through him that we live his day. And Ivan, unlike his Baptist bunk neighbor, is no saint with other-worldly aspirations; he wants to go on living, be it in hell, and will go to great lengths in order to assure survival—just as far as his self-respect will permit. For both instinct and experience have made him absorb one great lesson: though survival may require cunning, resiliency and courage, the decisive weapon is man's dignity as a human being. For what survives without it is a man no longer—a lesson driven home obliquely in some terrifying glimpses of just such survivors.

And so the squad moves on out into the day-long battle—against the murderous cold, against the guards, against squealers and trusties and laggards, against inadequate tools, broken machinery, hunger, insane production norms, chicanery and plain brutality. With concentrated fury the men attack their work, at first merely in order to keep from freezing to death; but as the day wears on, the task itself takes hold of them, welds them into an efficient and grimly determined team in which Ivan, by his skills as carpenter and mason, briefly assumes the lead. At sunset he finds himself almost reluctant to down his tools, even while lucidly mocking his own reluctance.

The evening still holds a few more dangers, each of them possibly mortal in this world where every choice is one between life and death. They are frisked at the camp gate, called out for two special shake-down inspections. A blade that Ivan smuggled into camp as a potentially marketable item would net him ten days in solitary, if discovered; and ten days in solitary on the bare cement floor of an unheated cell in the middle of winter means death. By the end of the book, Solzhenitsyn has created an unforgettable vision of the camp, of the world it represents, and of the men who against all reason and all odds have not only survived in it but lived and preserved the will to go on living.

One day in the life of Ivan Denisovich has come to a close, and his being there to know it is the essence of his victory. To quote him in his own words . . .

But the moment we set out to quote Ivan in English, we run into trouble. He is available in two versions, both published on the same day; but this

The Old Adam

A photo of someone else's childhood,
a garden in another country — world
he had no part in and has no power to imagine:

yet the old man who has failed his memory
keens over the picture — 'Them happy days —
gone — gone for ever!' — glad for a moment to suppose

a focus for unspent grieving, his floating
sense of loss.
He wanders

asking the day of the week, the time,
over and over the wrong questions.
Missing his way in the streets

he acts out
the bent of his life,
the lost way

never looked for, life
unlived, of which he is dying
very slowly.

'A man,'
says his son, 'who never
made a right move in all his life.' A man

who thought *the dollar was sweet* and
couldn't make a buck, riding the subway
year after year to untasted sweetness,

loving his sons obscurely, incurious
who they were, these men, his sons —
a shadow of love, for love longs

to know the beloved, and a light goes with it
into the dark mineshafts of feeling —. A man
who now, without knowing,

in endless concern for the smallest certainties,
looking again and again at a paid bill,
inquiring again and again, 'When was I here last?'

asks what it's too late to ask:
'Where is my life? Where is my life?
What have I done with my life?'

Denise Levertov

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uncommon bounty, I'm afraid, presents us not with an embarrassment of choices so much as with a choice of embarrassments.

E. P. Dutton, under contract with the Russian publishers, is bringing out an authorized edition, with royalties going to the author. Its translation was prepared in Moscow by Ralph Parker, a former British correspondent who has since taken up permanent residence in Russia.

Praeger proudly proclaims its version as being "unauthorized by any official Soviet agency," and insists that it feels morally constrained to ignore copyright, since Russia refuses to enter into any international agreements protecting foreign authors published in the USSR. Royalties from the sale of this edition will be donated to the International Rescue Committee. The translation was done by Max Hayward, co-translator of *Doctor Zhivago*, and Ronald Hingley, both of Oxford.

The controversy between the two publishers, the merits of their respective positions, and the ethical, legal and political issues involved, may have their own interest, but they are not relevant to the novel itself. As to the politics of the translators, neither version would seem to reflect any particular ideological bias, whatever else it may reveal about the men responsible for it.

Here, to resume our quote, is Ivan in the "authorized" version:

> *Shukhov went to sleep fully content. He'd had many strokes of luck that day: they hadn't put him in the cells; they hadn't sent his squad to the settlement; he'd swiped a bowl of kasha at dinner; the squad leader had fixed the rates well; he'd built a wall and enjoyed doing it; he'd smuggled that bit of hacksaw blade through; he'd earned a favor from Tsezar that evening; he'd bought that tobacco. And he hadn't fallen ill. He'd got over it.*
>
> *A day without a dark cloud. Almost a happy day.*

This is the same passage in the Praeger edition:

> *Shukhov went to sleep, and he was very happy. He'd had a lot of luck today. They hadn't put him in the cooler. The gang hadn't been chased out to work in the Socialist Community Development. He'd finagled an extra bowl of mush at noon. The boss had gotten them good rates for their work. He'd felt good making that wall. They hadn't found that piece of steel in the frisk. Caesar had paid him off in the evening. He'd bought some tobacco. And he'd gotten over that sickness.*
>
> *Nothing had spoiled the day, and it had been almost happy.*

The two English texts, though at opposite ends from each other, are both about equally remote from the prose of the original.

Parker's version constitutes an inept and pedestrian rendition, true to the letter but false to the spirit—faithful, in a colorless way, to Solzhenitsyn's literal meaning but in the process transforming a very Russian peasant into an oddly named British schoolboy who is having a spot of trouble but keeps a stiff upper lip and all that.

Nothing pedestrian, on the other hand, about Hayward and Hingley. On the assumption that Ivan, were he an American of comparable social and educational background, would not use the slangy but essentially literate, certainly grammatical vernacular, of Solzhenitsyn's hero, they have evolved a patois of their own coinage, a sort of pidgin Brooklynese made in Oxford that, again without actually mistranslating, distorts the whole spirit of the original. Their Ivan Denisovich sounds rather like a small-time mobster operating out of a Greenpoint candy store.

It may well be that the true flavor of the original is impossible to capture; it certainly cannot be done in a race against deadlines. Despite their obvious flaws, both translations offer an approximate and still very exciting idea of Solzhenitsyn's talent and the sweep of his vision.

Attention to the Africans

THE HUMAN FACTOR IN CHANGING AFRICA. By Melville J. Herskovits. Alfred A. Knopf. 500 pp. $6.95.

COPPER TOWN: CHANGING AFRICA. The Human Situation on the Rhodesian Copperbelt. By Hortense Powdermaker. Harper & Row. 391 pp. $7.95.

Stanley Meisler

The flood of recent writing about Africa has rushed in two directions. One has been the Tarzan-pygmy-*Time* Magazine-cannibal-witch doctor-Robert Ruark way. The other has been the slide rule and footnote way of the political scientist, studying the twists and turns of Dark Continent politicians as if they were all Lyndon Johnsons. But Africa is not a land of comic-strip characters or of leaders practiced in the fragile art of gentlemanly politics. Either approach ignores the human side of Africa. Anthropologists Melville J. Herskovits and Hortense Powdermaker, in their new books, try to illuminate just that.

Herskovits, sixty-seven-year-old director of the Program of African Studies at Northwestern University, has long been known as a kind of grandfather of American scholarship on Africa. He started the Northwestern African program in 1947—in those pre-Congo crisis days when courses on Africa attracted no more than a few oddballs and anthropology majors instead of the hundreds that now cram into lecture halls to get the word on Tshombe and Kwame and Tom Mboya. He has written many books, mostly on Africa, the Negro race and cultural anthropology.

In *The Human Factor in Changing Africa*, Herskovits tries to summarize decades of scholarship, so that the general reader can make something of the mystifying and ever-changing events of the continent. Herskovits concerns himself mostly with how the impact of colonial rule changed African cultures, and with how the cultures themselves changed some of the European innovations.

With his cultural insights, Herskovits continually sheds light on puzzling aspects of Africa. Why the wide African support for Lumumba after President Kassavubu deposed him? Herskovits: Other African leaders, trained under the French or British parliamentary system, did not understand the Belgian system which allows the chief of state to dismiss the prime minister without a vote in parliament. Why do African farmers shun modern methods? Herskovits: "African farmers are no more conservative than farmers elsewhere." They will accept change when you show them the advantages—so long as the change does

Stanley Meisler, a Washington newsman, has returned recently from a seven-month tour of Africa under a grant from the Ford Foundation.

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not tear them too far from their cultural beliefs. One problem, however, remains. In some areas, discrimination has taught Africans to suspect any advice that comes from a European. Why do the former French colonies keep so close to France? Herskovits: French-speaking African intellectuals, like Leopold Senghor of Senegal, have long pondered their own cultural values and fostered the philosophy of *négritude*, the essence of things African. They now can "face their former rulers with well-reasoned convictions of their own inner worth, and without having to reject the European contribution in order to secure the validity of their African cultural commitment."

The sympathetic and sensitive approach of Herskovits brings understanding to the complications and confusions of Africa. But some gaps remain. Herskovits appears ill at ease among the problems of urban Africa, and his treatment of the cities seems perfunctory. In Africa, the anger and frustration and turmoil of cities erupt into nationalism and chaos and rebellion: they cannot be glossed over. In addition, Herskovits' subject is so broad—the continuous changes of sub-saharan Africa—that it and his wealth of evidence tend to keep the reader far from the human touches of Africa. This is probably inevitable when treating so broad a topic so thoroughly. Perhaps no one else could have done so full a job and carried the reader closer.

In *Copper Town* Miss Powdermaker's approach is much narrower, though her subject is as broad. She focuses on the town of Luanshya in the copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia and tries to define the moods and tensions of Africans caught in a swiftly changing society. She exploits the particular incident to illustrate the general movements in Africa.

An anthropologist who teaches at Queens College in New York, Miss Powdermaker has never specialized in African society. She has written earlier books on a Pacific island culture, a Deep South community and Hollywood. Her new book brims with psychoanalytical and anthropological theory, but most of this shrinks in importance and interest when read alongside a special bonus provided by the book. Her assistants spent much time in Luanshya writing down the everyday conversations of Africans. These are translated from the vernacular and offered in huge chunks in the book. They put us very close to Africa.

Here, for example, are the Africans of Luanshya watching an American cowboy movie, shouting, jumping, flexing their muscles with each blow on the screen:

Wheoo! He is intoxicated with a blow!

I know this cowboy. He does not play with anyone except his brother.

They all fear him because they cannot fight him.

Oh, that man will soon receive a blow.

He has let him go because the man is a weakling.

Ahass! One! One! Waan!

Look at that other man!

Oh, yes, that is the only man who can fight Jack! [The Africans, who, for the most part, do not understand English, call the hero of every cowboy movie "Jack."]

Look at his ears, they indicate that is a furious man!

That man in feathers is a Negro!

No. You do not know Negroes! He is a red Indian.

Look at that man. He is smoking opium.

What is it for?

Oh, so you do not know that it removes the sense of fear.

Hmm, Jack is very clever, he can fight them all.

Oh! Oh! Ooo! The cowards have retreated!

That is what I said.

Oh! Oh! Ooo! There they are. They are found by Jack.

One! Waan! [in unison with the blows].

Now next time he is going to that man who was smoking opium, who seems to be the leader of those cowards.

Oho! He is down already.

He is going to revenge on what they did to his son.

Whip. Oh-oo, he is caught by the neck by that whip.

One! Waaan!

Now the fight is hot.

Waan! Waan! There he goes through the window!

Wheooo! Wheooo! Waaan!

Ohoo, now those two heroes are the winners.

Yes, this is the kind of Jack we want.

Miss Powdermaker theorizes that cowboy movies particularly please those in a weak position in the power structure. "Male adolescents in the United States, feeling their growing male strength and powerless to use it against the control of their parents and other adults in authority enjoy cowboy films," she writes. "For the Africans, a better folk hero could not have been invented." She notes that "the hard-fighting cowboy, moving freely on his horse in wide-open spaces, surmounting all obstacles and always winning, is indeed an attractive hero for a people intensely fearful of losing some of their wide-open spaces to Europeans, who until recently held all the power."

Time after time in her study, Miss

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Powdermaker cites evidence of European ignorance of Africans, the most glaring being the white insistence that the majority of the Africans were not opposed to the creation of the federations of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953. "It was readily obvious that everyone, from school boys to illiterate adults, were against federation," she writes. The Africans feared—with just cause—that the federation was designed by the whites of Southern Rhodesia to maintain control over the Africans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Miss Powermaker's discussion of politics and nationalism, however, is dated. She began her field work in Northern Rhodesia in September, 1953, and remained until June, 1954. Her book was not published until eight years later. In the context of changing Africa, an era has passed. Her work dates from a time when the pressures of African nationalism were just beginning to mount, and it appears in a time when we need to understand how the Africans and Europeans of Luanshya are reacting to the full force of these pressures. Miss Powdermaker understands this deficiency. She had appealed to several foundations for a grant to allow her time to write the book earlier. They replied they would be happy to consider giving her money for another field trip but not for writing a book. Miss Powdermaker may be the victim of an academic world that still depreciates speed as an unseemly journalistic concept.

The Herskovits and Powdermaker books are both searching, understanding, valuable analyses of the human side of Africa; yet each, for its own reasons, lacks a true feel for some of the tensions and pressures and turmoil that characterize Africa today.

LETTER from PARIS

Alexander Werth

Some very odd things have been taking place in the Soviet Union in the fields of art and literature. First, the November issue of *Novy Mir* published the now world-famous *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* [see review of Ernst Pawel, page 100]. That admirable Soviet writer, Victor Nekrasov, whom I saw here in Paris recently, thought the appearance of the Solzhenitsyn story an excellent sign. One of the biggest taboos, he said, had at last been lifted, and Soviet writers would now be encouraged more than before to write the truth, and nothing but the truth about both the past and the present. He said:

Soviet life is not nearly as simple as some people in the West imagine. It is, in fact, more complicated than in the West. Our young people do an awful lot of thinking and arguing these days. Thus, they will sit round a bottle of vodka for hours, talking and talking about anything — the Cuban crisis, China, Berlin, the mess in our agriculture. There will soon be shown a three-hour film, called The Ilyitch Suburb, *dealing with the life of our young people. Nothing is less "ham" than this film. It deals with their life in all its complexity. Our young people are becoming the least standardized people in the world, and anyone who thinks that "Communist man" is a robot is just nuts.*

This conversation took place about five weeks ago: I rather doubt that Nekrasov would today take the same optimistic view of the immediate future of Russian literature; I even doubt that *The Ilyitch Suburb* will appear in its original form. The Party just now is clamping down not only on "modernism" and "formalism," but, indirectly also, on "individualism" in the Nekrasov sense.

The partisans of the robotlike "Soviet man" — survivors of the old "Stalinist gang" like Kochetov in literature and Laktionov in painting — are precisely the ones who have had the super-official pages of *Pravda* thrown open to them.

It is not clear what exactly started the "anti-modernist" offensive, but officially, it began with Khrushchev's visit to the Manège exhibition of Russian paintings early in December. There is reason to believe that the "Poets' Evening" of November 30 may have provided the spark. On that night, 14,000 people packed into the Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow to hear young modern poets recite their verse, and an overflow crowd of six or seven thousand more milled about outside. It nearly came to a riot. Significantly, the biggest ovation of all was given to the most "modernist," most "obscure" of the young Russian poets, twenty-nine-year-old Andrei Voznesensky [see "Three Poems by An
The Nation, Dec. 2
something of a rebel
been in France fo
month, appearing on
garde poets, visiti
Picasso. There is
believe that the Sov
shocked by Vozne
success at Luzhni
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"Poets' Evening" i
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was staged by th
people in favor o
Akhmatova. When
over, Akhmatova
will lead to no goo
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series of anti-forma
as a result of
and Zoshchenko we
the Writers' Unio
writers, painters,
and, ultimately,
bullied and victimi

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Voznesensky, with
numerous talks in
his "difficult" poe
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machines and ir
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editorials.

But although
to be essentially
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Socialist-realist ca
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and has declared
for the surrealist
His poems, as
second book, *Mo*
book, *Treugolnaya*
angular Pear) w
"1920," cover, ra
ically lyrical "A
to the noisy Amer
including the "
and "The Negroe
roll rhythms, and
poems as this one,

I am a family,
And seven "I's"
a spectrum,
Unbearable like
And the bluest o
Plays a pipe!
But in spring I

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solved in the loftier, more encompassing emotion.

The line of O'Neill's architecture in *Desire* is massively simple and strong. Though the play is written in what appears to be homely language, it is actually oriented toward a classic, almost Greek, nobility of construction and feeling. O'Neill was always straining his talent toward the largest designs, as *Lazarus Laughed* and *Mourning Becomes Electra* indicate. *Desire* is an epic play.

In relation to the text the production by José Quintero, with such talented actors as George Scott, Colleen Dewhurst, Rip Torn, strikes me as small, narrowly, almost pettily, realistic; lacking all largeness or majesty, without thematic spine. It is not only the production's intimacy (perhaps inevitable in the oblong of the tiny playhouse) which makes for melodrama, old-fashioned rural comedy and pathos of a personal nature that aspires to simplicity but comes close to hamminess.

But no doubt I am prejudiced. I directed this play myself in 1952. Readers should see it themselves: it is still as close to a classic of our theatre as one can find. Be your own critic!

RECORDS

Benjamin Boretz

A five-finger exercise is not music in any significant sense, and neither is most of what happens in the performances of the five Beethoven piano concertos recorded by Wilhelm Kempff. I find it inconceivable that anyone would take all the trouble to master the physical demands of these works if he could not see in them any greater distinction between one note and the next—or, for that matter, between one concerto and the next—than are to be found among compositions designed to improve finger dexterity or evenness of attack. But this seems to be the extent of Kempff's concern with the Beethoven works, for where his mechanical ability to control and shape a passage is most evident, he invariably chooses to impose on it the greatest degree of uniformity and neutrality.

The result is that the most interesting moments in these performances are the ones where the intrinsic force of a passage is so pronounced that it requires prodigious feats of pianistic discipline to subdue it into featurelessness. Unfortunately, whatever admiration one might feel for the sheer militancy of such an approach (which at least usually makes the notes run on time) disappears with the realization that the same result could have been achieved by recording each successive sound separately and splicing all the bits together.

Kempff's conductor here is Ferdinand Leitner, whose basic approach to any musical situation seems to be articulation at all costs: as a result, the orchestral parts break down into little isolated islands of sound, separated by so much dead air that it would probably have been possible to record the complete works of Webern in the accumulated empty space. If any further discouragement is needed, neither the recorded sound nor the quality of the record surfaces is good.

The recordings of Schubert's *Die Winterreise* by Hans Hotter and that of *Die Schöne Müllerin* by Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau are both symptomatic of the disdain exhibited by many performers toward the most obvious and essential structural properties of the music they perform. They evidently prefer instead to substitute some completely external interpretive idea which is not only invariably far less interesting than the composer's, but also gives rise to continual conflicts between the directions implied by the musical elements and those imposed in the "interpretation." Moreover, where songs are concerned, the presence of a text seems to increase the temptation to ignore the demands of musical coherence, in favor of a supposedly "dramatic" projection of qualities that can be conjured from the words alone.

Thus Hotter approaches the *Winterreise* cycle as, simply, a collection of twenty-four separate songs connected by a sad story, and shows no awareness of the network of subtle interrelations that binds them together into a formal totality. The most glaring evidence of this is his blithe destruction of Schubert's carefully constructed tonal curve by the arbitrary key-transpositions of the songs purely for vocal convenience. The effect of this on the cycle is analogous to what would happen to the integrity of a symphony if one of its movements were to be transposed, or if perhaps just one or two sections within a single movement were so treated.

The other aspects of the performance are consistent with this level of intelligence: each song is tackled with a kind of exaggerated gesturing that might perhaps be appropriate to a work on the scale of a Wagner opera, where an entire phrase sometimes functions as the smallest perceptible unit of inflection, but is incongruous in the context of this vocal chamber music. In these Schubert songs, a single phrase is as large a unit in relation to the whole as an entire scene is

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to an opera, and its articulation must be equivalently detailed and sensitive. Hotter's bullish performance flattens the motion within each song, so that it becomes the mere statement of a single idea rather than a fully traversed and developed form. Similarly, the multitude of graduations of quality among the songs is simplified into two general categories: "dramatic," which mostly signifies considerable uncertainty about pitch, especially at faster tempos; and "simple," where the vocal qualities at least tend to be restrained. The equal importance of the piano part is also ignored, but in this case the pianist (Erik Werba) seems too intimidated or too weak to produce even a reasonably clear background. As with other recent Deutsche Grammophon releases, the recorded sound is hazy, and the surfaces are not quiet.

By comparison with Hotter, Fischer-Dieskau's *Schöne Müllerin* is a model of musicianship, principally by virtue of the frequent projection of significant details (especially by the pianist, Gerald Moore), and by the fact that the gamut of vocal qualities, which goes from whispering to shouting, occasionally also includes "singing" as one of its intermediate stages. But the absence of any real awareness of the nature of the music is equally plain, if differently and less objectionably manifested. Again, the fundamental tonal structure, which is so deliberately simple in the *Schöne Müllerin* that its relevance to the "folkishness" of the songs seems unmistakable, is arbitrarily disarranged; and even though the incongruities here are not so great as in Hotter's case, such a crucial long-range association as the repetition, in the final two songs, of the relationship between the tonality of the first and second is painfully absent. But the most pervasive misunderstanding is the shaping of each song according to Fischer-Dieskau's reading of the Müller poems. His interpretation, in every case, results in accentuations, phrasings and emphases that differ from Schubert's — and Schubert's intent is fully revealed in the songs themselves, first of all by the musical structure and secondarily by the special relationships between both the piano and vocal parts and the words of the text.

The incomparable superiority of a performance generated by an awareness of these considerations, a superiority not only in terms of musical distinction but also in the heightening of purely verbal qualities, is impressively demonstrated in Aksel Schiötz's recording, made just after World War II. Schiötz traces the line and phrase inflections with such precision and delicacy that he achieves a sense of complete formal statement despite the quite narrow range of dynamics, vocal timbres and rhythmic differentiation that he actually employs. Fischer-Dieskau, on the other hand, for all his vocal acting, insistent stressing of high points, exaggerated tempos and aggressive rhythmic propulsion, seems to cover much less ground, and finally must rely on frank literary pretentiousness (he includes readings of Müller's prologue and epilogue, which have no significance whatever for the music) in order to provide even the semblance of artistic "profundity."

BEETHOVEN: Five Piano Concertos. Wilhelm Kampff, piano. Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, Ferdinand Leitner, cond. Deutsche Grammophon (S) LPM 138 770/3.

SCHUBERT: *Die Schöne Müllerin.* Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau, baritone. Gerald Moore, piano. Angel (S) 3628.

Aksel Schiötz, tenor. Gerald Moore, piano. Danish Odeon MOAK 1.

Die Winterreise. Hans Hotter, baritone. Erik Werba, piano. Deutsche Grammophon (S) 138 778/9.

The Pets' Cemetery

Someone dug up
bones
in the back yard
of the deserted house
the bones
of the kitten as white as milk
the bones
of the terrier as brown as autumn
the bones
of the yellow canary
the black bird
Someone
reverent
put them all back
in the brown earth
and lay white flowers
on their bed
one bed for the dead

Joseph Joel Keith

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Crossword Puzzle No. 996

By FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS:

1 Famous bowler from Louisville? (8, 5)
10 Arm of steel, as a homonym of a synonym. (5)
11 It's no race for the results of the needle to be noticed! (9)
12 Animal heat effect in the battle. (9)
13 Spoke for one of these, perhaps. (5)
14 What a bad summer is likely to do. (12)
19 Do they make up this thing with a reduced rate of charge? (5, 7)
22 A periodical controversy? (5)
24 The bottom of the sea? (4, 5)
25 It's all right to be roughed badly around it, but it doesn't imply what's underfoot is pilfered. (6, 3)
26 They might be driven in and slain. (5)
27 His subjects might go on to be pages, at least. (13)

DOWN:

2 Worn out. (6)
3 An old magician, with a little help from above, suggests the capsule news from Abraham's place. (9)
4 More than boil a stone. (9)
5 Only five letters long? (5)
6 and 21 Come in and lift up the carrier, perhaps. (10)
7 Strange that it's not an A-class thoroughfare in New York. (8)
8 Prepare someone, even though he's not the best man available. (5)
9 Where trials might be in the order of 6⅞ and 38 short. (7)
15 Slacking off with a tin leg put out of joint. (7, 2)
16 Not polished with oil in its basic form. (9)
17 Can be seen to be self-knowledge? (7)
18 Urge to make love—at breakfast, yet! (8)
20 Evidently they had to get along with those who punched them, according to song. (6)
21 See 6 down
23 The very rash don't get beat—according to each. (5)
24 Displayed by man after 23 in play? (5)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 995

ACROSS: 1 Sweethearts; 9 Allergic; 10 Torrid; 11 Baldric; 12 Scenery; 14 Fetish; 15 Wheeling; 17 Surgical; 20 Powder; 22 Dealing; 24 Succors; 26 Pepper; 27 Epitaphs; 28 Well-wishers. DOWN: 2 Wheedling; 3 English; 4 Hock; 5 Attache; 6 Turin; 7 Cleave; 8 Micron; 13 Swill; 16 Lawn chair; 18 Uneven; 19 Central; 20 Prudish; 21 Earthy; 23 Lapse; 25 Peri.

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LETTERS

Most useful

Hanover, N.H.

Dear Sirs: The enclosed contribution to *The Nation* was prompted by a number of things. First, I continually enjoy my weekly copy and am grateful to be able to read what is therein contained. *The Nation* is the most useful periodical I know in all areas of criticism and commentary.

The new type face symbolizes a new vigor in your magazine which seems to have rubbed off onto me. Even the higher subscription price helped — by pointing out the great dependence that you have on your readers.

Another reason for my contribution is a completely different one. Today, I found that a letter addressed to you from my brother, Andy Jackson, had received your personal attention and interest — a rare and unexpected happening that in itself is worth some acknowledgment.

Thank you for so far giving me seven months of interesting, enlightening and thoroughly enjoyable reading. *Christopher Jackson*

In appreciation

Princeton, N.J.

Dear Sirs: I had already sent in my $12 subscription and contribution to The Nation Associates when I read your "Publisher's Statement" in the Jan. 5 issue.

I am enclosing a check for an additional $10 to express my great appreciation of the unique and constructive role of *The Nation.*

Continue your good work!

Gregory P. Tschebotarioff

One of many

Los Angeles, Calif.

Dear Sirs: Following reading your "Publisher's Statement" in the Jan. 5 issue of *The Nation,* I am enclosing check for $10 to help you meet your deficit.

I am sure I am just one of many who will come forward and help at this time. Thank you once again for your fine work. *Martha N. Smith*

Worried reader

New York City

Dear Sirs: I've been a reader for more years than I care to number. This is my first subscription.

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Gordon C. Kashin

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